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Prejudice research shows that most psychologists focus on moderate prejudice in 
superficial settings, rather than extreme prejudice in real-life situations. The present study 
used an interpretive phenomenological analysis guided by social constructivism on 21 
biographies to investigate how the authors voluntarily disaffiliated from their groups and 
altered their prejudice. The narratives were retrieved from popular and academic book 
and journal memoirs, digital and print interviews and articles, podcasts and video clips of 
members of closed faith societies who were socialized to resent outsiders, with their 
resentments turning into violence. The analysis used Willig’s 4 stages: immersion in 
material, identifying core themes, summary of themes, and the amalgamation of the 
summary into themes. Results of this study indicate that there seems to be a turning point 
in which participants perceive the outside world in a different way. This change in 
perception may occur in members of closed groups through conducting critical analyses, 
reading source texts, and experiencing altruism from a member of the resented outside 
groups. Recommendations include that communication between outsiders and group 
members should reflect subtle, fact-based reasoning and manifest a customized approach 
to reducing prejudice. The study offers an original approach for understanding socialized 
violence. Governments and relevant entities could use this research to train invited 
outsiders of a cult or closed faith society regarding how to decrease the prejudice of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
The study of prejudice is one of the most voluminous fields in social science, but 
as Paluck (2012) and Paluck and Green (2009) said, research should focus on deeply-held 
prejudice, rather than on the weak or moderate prejudice that psychologists tend to 
observe. Prejudice is instigated by an individual’s society or culture (Paluck 2012, 2016; 
Sherif & Sherif, 1953), where prejudice towards different others is inculcated in its 
members. This may explain why the prejudice-reducing interventions that are mostly 
developed in liberal colleges on insulated college students do little to reverse prejudicial 
attitudes (Giner-Sorolla, 2001). In fact, Paluck and Green (2009) recommended that 
researchers evaluate real life situations for more accurate results and more effective 
prejudice-reducing interventions. 
Multidisciplinary studies, such as identity economics, sociology, 
ethnopsychology, anthropology, and social psychology, show that individuals have an 
innate need to belong to a group (Leary & Baumeister, 1995), to the point that people 
who live in highly conformist settings are more likely to identify with their group norms, 
even when these practices contradict normative standards that are endorsed by the 
broader society (Paluck, 2012), harm one’s health and safety (Akerlof & Kranton, 2013; 
Goldman, Giles, & Hogg, 2014; Hogg, Siegel, & Hohman, 2011), or contradict one’s 
private beliefs (Prentice & Miller, 1996). One example of such groups is strongly 
cohesive religious societies, also called closed faith societies that insulate themselves 
from outsiders. In such groups, members are more vulnerable to indoctrination, since the 
group imposes strict rules, has strong leaders, and sets clear boundaries (Weinstein, 
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2006). Consequences for defiance are also punitive and severe. Subsequently, I found it 
all the more incredible that certain individuals raised in these settings seemed to be able 
to objectively detach themselves from the toxicity of their environments, assess their 
socializations, and voluntarily reverse their enculturated hostilities to outsiders. 
This study has been a product of more than 30 years of reading, reflection, 
personal experience and interviews with former members of obedience-demanding, or 
closed faith enclaves, prompted by my own experiences of leaving an isolated faith 
community that applauded and practiced violence. I have also conducted wide and 
intensive reading on multidisciplinary and related topics, more specifically on 
epistemology, ethno psychology, religion, history, anthropology, sociology, and 
advanced mathematics, along with my Master’s in philosophy and advanced logics. I 
interviewed and worked with cults (e.g., Hari Krishna, the Moonies); interviewed, taught, 
counseled, and worked with aspiring and actual terrorists (e.g., Zionist and Palestinian) in 
the Middle East; interviewed, counseled, and taught Neo-Nazis as well as former-
communists (Hungary, Moldavia, Ukraine); and regularly experience Trumpism, white 
supremacism and confederate loyalty in parts of North Virginia and environs. As an 
aside, I studied with Yigal Amir, the man who assassinated Israel’s PM Yitzchak Rabin. 
My experiences gave me a unique insider perspective to this study but also made me a 
subjective researcher, which is why I labored all the harder to become aware of and 
hedge my bias. 
This is the first study in this genre that uses a qualitative approach based on an 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) to investigate deeply-held prejudice in a 
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real-life setting and to examine whether and how some individuals who grow up in 
indoctrinated closed faith societies independently reverse their taught attitudes. Although 
this study will be limited in its transferability for reasons that include its qualitative 
methodology and its extremely small sample, I dare to hope that this dissertation may 
contribute to the research literature on extreme prejudice. The rest of this chapter 
discusses the research problem and the conceptual framework for the study before 
defining certain terms, detailing limitations of this study, and suggesting implications for 
positive social change. 
Background  
In 2009, Paluck and Green (2009) conducted the most extensive literature 
research to date on prejudice-reducing interventions, to find which prejudice 
interventions worked and to assess the internal and external reliability of the different 
prejudice studies and their methods. Paluck and Green (2009) defined prejudice as 
negative bias, racism, homophobia, ageism, antipathy toward ethnic, religious, national, 
or other groups, prejudice toward persons who are overweight, poor, or disabled, and 
attitudes toward diversity, reconciliation, and multiculturalism. At the same time, Paluck 
and Green (2009) excluded gender-based prejudice (i.e., beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors 
toward gender), although they focused on gender-identity prejudices such as 
homophobia. In total, the researchers accumulated 985 reports, which they divided into 
three categories: nonexperimental field studies (66%), laboratory-based experimental 
studies (29%), and triangulated methods/field experimental studies (11%). 
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 The nonexperimental prejudice intervention studies consisted of noncontrol 
groups and evaluation studies that mostly investigated sensitivity and cultural-
competence programming, mass media campaigns, and diversity training. Out of 207 of 
these studies, Paluck and Green (2009) challenged the internal reliability of 195. When it 
came to laboratory or purely experimental studies, Paluck and Green (2009) found these 
studies creative and precise but faulted them for studying prejudice that is a real-life 
attitude in a superficial environment. Examples of such studies included intergroup 
approaches, social identity and categorization theories, as well as psychological affect 
and cognitions. Their methods ranged from instruction, expert opinion and norm 
information, manipulating accountability, consciousness-raising, and targeting personal 
identity, self-worth, or emotion. On mixed methods prejudice reduction studies, Paluck 
and Green (2009) concluded that most of these studies lacked rigorous evaluation and 
needed more intensive and extensive research. The focus of these studies included 
cooperative learning, social media-based technology, discussions, peer influence, 
cognitive training, self-worth interventions, and social categorization.  
Additionally, Paluck and Green (2009) recommended research on the 
psychological implications of obedience and conformity. The researchers (2009) noted 
that: 
Psychologists are a long way from demonstrating the most effective ways to 
reduce prejudice. Due to weaknesses in the internal and external validity of 
existing research, the literature does not reveal whether, when, and why 
interventions reduce prejudice in the world. (p. 360)  
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Paluck and Green (2009) advised researchers to include identity-focused perspectives like 
social identity and categorization, identity and value-motivated techniques, and social 
cognitive (stereotype and implicit prejudice) interventions, as well as to focus on areas 
like multiculturalism and moral education. The reviewers added that although laboratory 
experiments test certain theses with precision, all prejudice-oriented experiments should 
be replicated outside the laboratory on “the many millions of ordinary citizens living in 
conflict or postconflict settings” (p. 359) and that scientists should focus on “obedience 
and conformity, the very forces that have been implicated in some of the most notorious 
expressions of prejudice in world history” (p. 360). Paluck and Green (2009) concluded 
that “researchers should strive to reduce deeply held prejudices rather than the more 
transitory prejudices associated with ‘minimal’ groups” (p. 361).  
In her 2012 review, Paluck (2012) observed that too many prejudice-reducing 
interventions failed to show statistical effect, because they investigated attitude in the 
classroom instead of in a real life setting.  Paluck (2012) suggested that social scientists 
use Lewin’s interactionist perspective, where attitude is studied as the integration of 
person and situation and where situation represents the social, cultural, and political 
forces in the person’s immediate environment. In the same way, Murrar, Gavac, and 
Brauer (2016) called for more real-world investigations on a diversified and more 
representative population outside the university walls. 
The following study followed Paluck and Green’s (2009) suggestions and 
investigated real life prejudice in the context of an obedience and conflict setting. It also 
focused on prejudice in its most extreme form, as indoctrinated attitude, and considered 
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sociological constructs like contact, social identity and categorization, social cognition 
and moral education. The forms of prejudice investigated in this study were racism, 
homophobia, antipathy toward ethnic, religious, national, and other groups, and distrust 
regarding diversity, reconciliation, and multiculturalism in general. 
Problem Statement 
Most prejudice-reducing interventions are conducted on American, largely liberal, 
college students who are sheltered from the types of environments that produce extreme 
prejudice (Pollack & Green, 2009). Meanwhile, extreme prejudice from tribalism, 
populism, and nativism expanded over the last two years (Slate, 2018).  Examples include 
white supremacism, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and homophobia. Of the 
complete range of prejudice-reducing interventions that Paluck and Green (2009) 
investigated, all of their studies dealt with weak to moderate prejudice and all were tested 
in sheltered conflict-free environments.  
As Paluck (2016) reflected:  
What do social scientists know about reducing prejudice in the world? In short, 
very little. Of the hundreds of studies on prejudice reduction conducted in recent 
decades, only 11% test the causal effect of interventions conducted in the real 
world. (p. 147) 
Paluck (2009) called for more rigorous studies that integrate theory and 
methodology and insisted that researchers investigate subjects in conflict-filled 
environments. Both researchers urged psychologists to probe deeply-held prejudice rather 
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than the more transitory prejudices associated with peripheral situations and conflict-free 
groups. This is what this study sets out to do.  
Purpose of the Study 
The study analyzed autobiographical data from defectors of closed faith societies 
to identify core themes associated with the retraction of their socialized prejudices.  
The narratives were retrieved from popular and academic book and journal memoirs, 
digital and print interviews and articles, podcasts, and video clips. Themes were analyzed 
to understand the lived experiences of each participant and their motivations for 
renouncing their bias. This study’s goal is to help peace activists and state-sponsored 
programs generate and test appropriate interventions to prevent and defuse bigotry in 
insulated societies.  
Research Questions 
I used autobiographical material to qualitatively examine the lived experiences of 
21 defectors from closed faith groups. This study was guided by the following research 
questions:  
RQ1: What are the lived experiences of defectors of closed faith groups as they disengage 
and deradicalize?  
RQ2: What are the pathways for changing prejudice among defectors of closed faith 
groups?  
Conceptual Approach 
I used the theory of social constructivism. Social constructivism says knowledge 
is constructed through one’s particular environment and that one’s perceptions derive 
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from the culture or environment one inhabited (Young & Colin, 2004). It repudiates the 
idea that observations accurately reflect the observed world (Murphy et al., 1998). The 
phrase was coined by Berger and Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality 
(1961), which maintained that people’s knowledge and conceptions of reality come from 
their societies, making one’s experience of reality socially constructed. I approached my 
research with the admission that my judgments were shaped by my history, identity, 
culture, and experiences, and that my textual interpretations were, subsequently, 
subjective.   
Nature of the Study 
This study used the interpretive phenomenological approach (IPA), where 
autobiographical texts in the form of books, print and digital articles, video clips, and 
podcasts were analyzed to search for common patterns and themes (Smith, Larkin, & 
Flowers, 2009).  I chose IPA, since this approach seeks to discover how individuals 
construct meaning of their experiences (Moerer-Urdahl & Creswell, 2004); I sought to 
discover how certain individuals reversed their indoctrinated prejudices. My 
methodology choice was supported by studies (e.g., Todorova and Kotzeva (2006) on 
religious deconversion and Smith and Osborn (2007) on identity conflict) showing that 
IPA is widely used in mental health and therapy research on toxic attitudes. The 
interpretive phenomenological stance helped me navigate themes that emerged through 
analysis of the data. I used IPA to make sense of the contextual and evaluative 
experiences of the subjects. At the same time, I tried to maintain a social constructivist 
stance through all stages of the subject’s journey, from when the subject delegitimized 
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the outsider to when the subjects exited their groups and no longer saw the outsider as 
“other”. 
My subjects came from a range of closed faith societies that included Jehovah 
Witness, Old World Amish (Old Order), extreme Muslim groups (like Wahhabi or Salafi 
ideology), Haredi or Hassidic Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Mormon fundamentalism (FLDS 
Church), Christian fundamentalism (like Kingdom Identity Ministries, Pentecostalism, or 
some Baptist and Evangelical fundamentalist groups), and the Official Church of 
Scientology.  A common denominator in their education was their ties to their 
communities and the spectrum of methods used to raise strong barriers against the outside 
world. According to Hammersborg (2005), insular faith communities establish an 
understanding of “they” and “we”, where not even close relatives are part of the “we” if 
they exist outside the community. Such communities generate fear of everything outside. 
Children know that breaking out will result in severance from family and friends. 
Defectors run the risk of being despised, excommunicated, and losing their footholds in 
their communities (Hammersborg, 2005).  
Some of these communities restrict contact with the outside, to the extent that 
they ban outlets that include TV, radio, libraries, secular reading material, movies, and 
internet. Former participants described it as "You are even not allowed to have free 
thoughts” (Hammersborg, 2005, p.5).  The result is a climate of growing up without 
exposure to the “outside” world or the possibility for normal opinion forming, which 
makes it all the more striking that exceptional individuals break out to challenge their 
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indoctrinations. These are the subjects whose narratives I investigated in Chapter Three 
of this dissertation. 
Operational Definitions 
Amazing Apostates: Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006) gave this term to 
individuals who come from highly religious backgrounds with intense pressure to 
conform but disengaged from or exited their group. The researchers considered them 
amazing because these individuals seem to contradict socialization predictions. 
Closed faith society: A group or cult that insulates itself from other societies and 
cultures to protect its faith and opinions (Hammersborg, 2005). 
Deeply-held, or extreme prejudice: Extreme feelings of hostility manifested as 
one or more of the following: Homophobia, racism, antipathy toward ethnic, religious, 
national, and other groups, distrust to diversity, reconciliation, and multiculturalism, and 
may veer to violence or aggression against outsiders (Paluck & Green, 2009). 
Deradicalization: The process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting 
the group’s intolerant ideology, and embracing mainstream values (Rabasa et al., 2010). 
Prejudicial Cognition: The social scientific perspective that proposes that 
evolutionarily and culturally derived mental abstractions subconsciously cause humans to 
categorize or stereotype. Many contemporary social scientists tend to equate prejudice 
with stereotyping and subsequently develop prejudice-reducing interventions using 
cognitive-based strategies (Forscher & Devine, 2015).  
11 
 
Socialization: Socialization refers to a continuing process where an individual 
integrates the norms, values, behavior, and social skills from his or her culture as part of 
their identity (Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986).  
Assumptions 
My study’s faulty assumptions include the following. First, I assumed that I can 
extract certain insights from my limited population, although it is highly likely that a 
larger autobiographical pool may produce different or contradictory indicators. Second, 
autobiography lacks truth status (Trochim, 2006), which makes my study questionable 
from the start. Third, I focused on socialized prejudice ignoring the type of prejudice that 
comes from traumatized experiences, such as terrorism (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001). This 
limits research implications to the typified context of my subjects.  
Scope and Delimitations 
I used a purposive sample of texts collected from academic institutions, 
universities and colleges, and libraries from six countries and four US states. I also 
consulted blog posts, audio and visual material from print and digital sources. These 
included YouTube, forums, chats, and Reddit posts from people who dropped out of 
Judaism, Catholicism, Christianity, Islam, Mormonism, and sectarian groups like 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Hinduism, and Protestantism. Search terms included dropout, 
extreme religion, apostasy, extremism, fundamentalism, deradicalization, and 
radicalization.  
I chose to focus on faith-filled insular societies because I reasoned that the 
indoctrinations and experiences of members of such groups make their prejudice reversal 
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even more unnatural, and that their reversal comes from their own choice.  I limited my 
research to authors who received minimal or no contact with the outside world, who were 
incessantly taught hostility to outsiders, and who independently reversed their attitudes.  I 
also focused on psychological “push” features rather than “pull” features. “Pull” features 
refer to qualities outside the group that the individual finds attractive, while “push” 
features refer to adverse characteristics associated with the group that force people to 
reconsider their involvement with the group (McAdam, 1986). Even though both features 
are integrated, I focused on push aspects to see which elements of the experiences may 
have caused the subjects to disengage themselves from their group’s bigotry teachings, 
despite lacking contact with an outside world.  
Limitations 
The interpretative phenomenological approach comes with limitations which 
include researcher bias. In my case, additional limitations included that my 
interpretations could not be corroborated by my subjects, and that further research would 
likely find accounts that may provide different, or contradictory, perspectives. Yin (1994) 
pointed out that researchers who analyze documents or content tend to possess a biased 
selectivity, where the researcher may consciously or otherwise only select documents that 
support their views. This may have been the case with me. I acknowledged the risk of my 
experiences effecting my interpretations and chose the social constructivist stance to 
hedge my bias. I also engaged the services of an objective individual (a qualified student 
with no prior knowledge of my research or reading) to replicate the IPA reading and 
coding process.   
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Significance of the Study 
This study is significant in three ways. First, it used a qualitative approach, in line 
with Paluck and Green’s (2009) recommendation, to investigate prejudice in its real-life 
setting. Second, it investigated real-life prejudice from the standpoint of authentic 
experience, deviating from the typical prejudice-based studies that are conducted on 
largely liberal university students from privileged or upper middle-class backgrounds 
(e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009; Stangor, 2009). Third, this study examined a deep prejudice 
that causes violence and terrorism on a micro to macro scale. Significant segments of the 
world are indoctrinated in deep prejudice. I used IPA for insights on how to prevent and 
inhibit extreme prejudice in multicultural and cross-generational contexts.  
Summary 
Prejudice studies is one of the most voluminous fields in social science, but more 
research should focus on extreme prejudice and investigate prejudice reduction in a real-
life setting. This study used a qualitative phenomenological approach based on 
autobiographical texts of individuals who grew up in settings that inculcated extreme 
hostility to outsiders. The study probed for themes that may have caused these subjects to 
voluntarily retract their attitudes. Results of this study may help scientists and activists 
improve their understanding of the psychology of prejudice reversal. Chapter Two 
summarizes and discusses limitations and gaps in the research.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This study analyzed autobiographical reports, memoirs, and interviews from 
multiple individuals who were raised in prejudice-indoctrinating closed faith societies, 
and who voluntarily reversed their prejudices. The study aimed to understand the lived 
experiences of these individuals as they reversed their attitudes to outsiders. In this way, 
this study sought to fill gaps in prejudice-literature, by focusing on prejudice in in its real-
life context and in its most extreme form (e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009; Paluck, 2012; 
Murrar, Gavac, and Brauer, 2016).  
Paluck and Green (2009) and Paluck (2012) noted that social scientists tend to 
neglect prejudice drivers like conflict, obedience, and conformity and that most prejudice 
studies separate attitude from environment (i.e., they study bias in a superficial insulated 
setting). This study attempted to correct for these gaps by noting that since individuals 
are inseparable from their environments, their attitudes need to be studied in their 
environmental contexts (e.g., Paluck, 2012). My study, therefore, used an interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA) to uncover emergent themes from the lived experience 
of defectors from closed faith societies who were socialized to demonize and harm 
outsiders. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Sources used for my literature research came from peer-reviewed content on 
prejudice as well as from multi-disciplinary texts and were retrieved from libraries, 
colleges and universities in Israel, United States, Britain, Switzerland, Prague, Moldova, 
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and Hungary. Peer-reviewed journal sources came from Walden University’s 
EBSCOHost system, ScienceDirect, SAGE Journals Online, PubMed and 
PubMedCentral, Academic OneFile (Galegroup), and Omnifile full-text. Key search 
words used for the literature review included the following: Loss of faith, prejudice, and 
extreme prejudice, review of prejudice, intolerance, conflict, bias, homophobia, inter-
group conflict, and stereotype.  
Conceptual Framework 
I used the theory of social constructivism to guide me. The theory acknowledges 
that human perceptions emerge from environmental influences (Young & Colin, 2004) 
and reinforces Bacon’s (1897) thesis that one’s observations inaccurately reflect the 
observed world (Murphy et al., 1998).  
Social constructionism is related to the postmodernist interpretivist approach on 
how cognitive meanings are created, developed and sustained, and, like interpretivism, 
tries to generate an objective science to investigate subjective experience (Schwandt, 
2003). In their social construction of knowledge, Berger and Luckmann (1961) proposed 
that knowledge is societally derived by each society deciding what it wishes to focus on 
and by each society inheriting and developing its own terminology to discuss fields of 
knowledge. This affects one’s epistemological perceptions on all elements of the world 
and human conduct. The main problem with social constructionism is that it challenges 
even seemingly self-evident and stable realities (e.g., Schwandt, 2003) and, consequently, 
opens the way to subjective and, often contradictory, multiple realities, making it 
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impossible to formulate any serious conclusions. I, therefore, only used social 
constructivism as a tool to make me aware of and monitor my bias.  
Literature Review Related to Key Theories and Concepts 
Duckitt (1992) divided prejudice-based research into seven distinct periods and 
showed how each era influenced prejudice research through its particular social-political 
construction. Prejudice research began in the 19th century with its race and class theory, 
where scientists suggested that certain nationalities and ethnicities dominated others. 
Historian John S. Haller (as cited in Sarich & Miele, 2005) wrote “almost the whole of 
scientific thought in America and Europe… accepted race inferiority” (cited by Sarich & 
Miele, 2005, (p. 78). Race theories encouraged Whites to subjugate Blacks under the 
understanding that Blacks were intellectually backwards, over-sexed, and primitive. 
Psychologists developed tests that seemed to confirm this thesis. 
In the 1930s to the 1940s, scientists turned their attention to the mechanisms of 
intra-group bias. That paradigm shift emerged from socio-political upheavals that 
included race and gender protest movements in Europe and the United States and the 
cumulative effect of two World Wars. The last War, in particular, stirred discussion on 
the irrationality of ethnic stereotyping and prejudice. Several of the commentators, 
including Asch, Milgram, and Festinger, were victims of German discrimination. Winer, 
one of Milgram's obedience study subjects, noted that "Milgram was very Jewish. I was 
Jewish. We talked about this. There was obviously a motive behind neutral research" 
(Alchetron, online). The post-War era was one where scientists redefined prejudice as a 
faulty and irrational attitude and sought to understand its causes. 
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In the 1950s, psychologists used psychoanalysis as an explanatory tool for 
prejudice (Duckitt, 1992) and suggested that bias came from repression and served to 
relieve inner conflicts and frustrations. Nazis, for instance, allegedly vented their political 
humiliation on weaker people like Jews, gypsies, or homosexuals. American scientists 
used methodologies like case studies and longitudinal or correlational research to trace 
inter-race relations to their Freudian core. Although psychodynamics is rarely used to 
explain prejudice today, some studies (e.g., Jackson, 2011) still use this model to 
understand stereotype and conflict.  
The fifth paradigm of prejudice emerged in the late 1960s and 1970s, when 
research transitioned from individual-level psychological factors to cultural and social 
influences (Duckitt, 1992). The context was race riots in South Africa with government-
backed racism and segregation in America’s South (Blackwell, 1982). Whole legions of 
seemingly good and genteel people discriminated against humans of different colors and 
race. Psychologists proposed two psychological mechanisms, socialization (Lewin, 1952; 
Pettigrew & Back, 1967; Rokeach, 1960) and conformity (Adorno et al., 1950; Lewin, 
1952; Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Back, 1967) and promised that harmony would be 
achieved when Whites accepted Blacks in all areas of their lives. The urban revolts of the 
late 1960s and the hardening of resistance demolished such optimism and showed that 
prejudice extended throughout the United States not just in the South. Sociologists turned 
to historical and sociological factors for drivers that included colonialism (Blauner, 
1972), a split labor market (Bonacich, 1972), institutionalized racism (Carmichael & 
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Hamilton, 1967), and the socioeconomic advantages for Whites in maintaining a stable 
Black underclass (e.g., Crandall & Schaller, 2004). 
Social scientists of the 1970s termed prejudice a more subtle, complex, and 
insidious type of racial bigotry (Frey & Gaertner, 1986), where antipathy appealed to 
convention for approval (Brewer et al., 2003; Fiske 2002). (Whites, for instance, would 
accuse minority groups of exploiting racial preferences (Schneider, 2005)). The 1970s 
also saw the minimal intergroup paradigm, which stated that people subconsciously 
categorized individuals into an “us” versus “them” schematology. As the 1970s drew into 
the Computer Age, social scientists discussed cognitive processes (e.g., Bar Tal et al, 
1989) and equivocated stereotype with prejudice. Prejudice was reduced to automatic 
cognitive elements. Hamilton (1981), for instance, reduced prejudice to stereotypes and 
called the attitude implicit and subconscious (see Dovidio et al., 2010; Fiske, 1998; 
Stangor, 2000; Whitley, Kite, & Adams, 2012 for further discussion, history, and 
literature review). Scientists developed priming procedures to elicit non-conscious 
processing, with Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz’s (1998) Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) becoming one of the most popular of such instruments. Famous contributors to this 
“unconscious bias approach” included Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and Kahneman, 
Slovic, and Tversky (1982), who demonstrated that rationality was reducible to mental 
heuristics. This cognitive approach is the theoretical basis that underlies most 
contemporary prejudice-associated interventions (e.g., Brown, 2010; Duckitt, 2002; Fiske 
& Taylor, 1991; Hamilton, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Some social scientists 
lamented that the “psychological approaches to intergroup relations [have] become more 
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and more focused upon the cognitive underpinnings of intergroup attitudes and less and 
less focused upon the affective determinants of prejudice” (Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 
1991, p. 360), or of sociological determinants, for that matter. As of 2018, the dominant 
approach to prejudice-reduction remains the cognitive model.  
The Role of Cognition in Intra-Group Conflict, Bias, and Prejudice 
Most researchers use the cognitive approach for prejudice, equivocating prejudice 
with stereotype formation, activation and function (e.g., Brewer et al., 2003; Duckitt, 
1992; Stangor, 2009). Their works tend to follow Kahneman and Tversky’s (2000) 
pioneering research, where the authors showed that people tend to perceive and judge 
others automatically. Kahneman and Tversky called these cognitive biases “judgment” or 
“evaluation” heuristics. Other researchers labeled these heuristics “social categorization” 
(e.g., Turner & Oakes, 1986), where perceivers automatically classify individuals on 
appearance, mannerisms, or other types of categories (Brewer et al., 2003; Fiske, 2002).  
Historians tend to trace this idea of social categorization to Allport, with 
twentieth-century and contemporary researchers (e.g., Brown, 1995) tracing these 
heuristics to early socialization from parents, teachers, or the person’s formative 
environment. Some researchers (e.g., Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001) suggest that these 
heuristics may be reversed through personal experience and social conditions. Scientists, 
such as Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998), Nosek and Banaji (2001), and 
Steinman and Karpinski (2009) developed a wide range of measurement techniques and 
research paradigms to uncover allegedly implicit bias. These tests work by a process 
called “priming” that exposes participants to a word or image supposed to trigger hidden 
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stereotypes (e.g., Ask, Granhag, Juhlin, & Vrij, 2012; Nosek & Banaji, 2001; Steinman & 
Karpinski, 2009). The IAT (Greenwald et al., 2002), for instance, measures how rapidly 
people categorize certain words and images. Faster mental responses to "whites or 
intelligence" and "blacks or violence" could indicate subversive bias. 
One of the most potent criticisms of this approach came from Dixon and 
colleagues (2014) who pointed out that while researchers banter over the relative 
inconsequentialities of implicit prejudice, they ignore the very real prejudice that harms. 
It is this type of prejudice, they say, that needs to be researched and treated. 
The Role of Affect in Intra-Group Conflict 
Critics of the cognitive-based framework (e.g., Dijker, 1987; Edwards & von 
Hippel, 1995; Esses, Haddock & Zanna, 1993; Pettigrew, 1997; Stangor, Sullivan & 
Ford, 1991; Zanna, Haddock & Esses, 1990) insist that since prejudice is an attitude, it is 
affect-based rather than cognitive in origin.  To quote Hamilton (1981): 
If there is any domain of human interaction that history tells us it is laden with 
strong, even passionate, feelings, it is in the area of intergroup relations. And this 
point makes clear the fact that the cognitive approach, despite the rich and varied 
approaches it has made in recent years, is by itself incomplete. (p. 347) 
If prejudice is affect, this may explain why prejudice-reducing programs that are 
formulated on cognitive assumptions tend to demonstrate mixed results. When such 
programs are tested on stereotype cognitions, the program seems to succeed, but when 
analyzing emotions, those same interventions fail or show insignificant results. 
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Neuroscience supports the idea that affect drives prejudice, with some fMRI 
studies (e.g., Amodio et al., 2003; Phelps et al., 2005) linking prejudice with heightened 
amygdala activity that is the neural region associated with emotion. Schwartz and Clore 
(1994) showed that people evaluate in terms of an “I feel” rather than an “I think” 
perspective, while Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) reported that feelings rather than 
perceptions prime social judgment. Forgas (1995) demonstrated that various conditions 
of affect, including valence, arousal properties, and motivation, conspire to influence 
social judgments and behaviors. Fein and Spencer (1997) stated that poor confidence - an 
emotion - triggers prejudice, while Smith (in Mackie & Hamilton, 1993) defined 
prejudice as “a social emotion experienced with respect to one’s social identity as a group 
member, with an outgroup as a target” (p. 304). Taylor (2007) conducted a textual 
analysis which showed that it is only the lowest levels of stereotype that exclude emotion. 
Prejudice, she said, ranges from highly emotive to muted, and less prejudiced individuals 
tend to use more cognitive descriptors than individuals on higher ends of the spectrum. 
High-level racist texts, like Hitler’s Mein Kampf, employed emotional terms more 
intensely and more frequently than less dispassionate, academic texts (Taylor, 2007).  
How is prejudice produced, or what are its underlying mechanisms? Certain 
scientists (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2006; Lazarus, 1984; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2000) suggested that affect and cognition combine to generate 
attitudes that include prejudice, while other scientists (e.g., Devine, 1989; Fazio, 1990; 
Pryor, Reeder, & Landau, 1999; Weiner, 1986; Zajonc, 1980, 2001) claimed that 
cognition and emotion inhabit separate interacting channels. Pryor and colleagues (1999) 
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distinguished between the attitude of prejudice that is affect-based and the perception of 
stereotype that originates from a rule-based, more rational cognitive process, slower to 
develop and easier to control. Similarly, Bodenhausen and Moreno (2001) affirmed that 
although stereotypes may shape intergroup perception and behavior, it is the feeling 
states that arises in the presence of members of stereotyped groups that shadows 
intergroup interactions. This may explain why the more passionate type of prejudice that 
comes from conflict-ridden situations typically resists remediation (Bar-Tal & Labin, 
2001).  
Social Psychology and Prejudice 
The social psychology perspective of prejudice suggests that people are 
acculturated by their groups and that they transmit their group’s norms, opinions and 
beliefs. The social identity model, for instance, emphasizes that individuals divide 
themselves into in-group/outgroup categories and that group membership determines 
partisanship to individuals (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Both Allport (1954; 1979) and 
Tajfel (1981) noted that people are acculturated to categorize individuals into groups, 
with Tajfel adding that people categorize to win their group’s approval. Wetherell’s 
(1987) self-categorization theory (SCT) posited that a person shifts between personal 
identity and social identity, depending on which aspect is most salient at the time. A 
person’s level of social identity exists on a continuum, with most people showing an 
average desire to belong to their groups, while some individuals manifest extreme group 
identity (Dovidio et al, 2003). It is these individuals who are more likely to demonstrate 
hostility to outsiders (Guimond, 2000). 
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Social identity theory reminds me of identity economics which states that people 
integrate social norms to gain pleasure from group-acceptance and to avoid the penalties 
and pain of rejection (e.g., Akerlof & Kranton, 2013). Individuals not only develop 
collective or group selves (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & 
McGarty, 1994), but some theorists say that individuals become, or are, groups, namely 
that they acquire an identity that is inseparable from their groups (Ellemers, 2012; 
Swann, 2009). This is particularly so with individuals who are socialized in a society of 
conformism, where indoctrination and societal intimidation emphasize group norms. 
Paluck (2012) pointed out that people in highly conformist settings are more likely to 
identify with group norms, even when these norms contradict normative standards that 
are endorsed by the broader society, harm one’s health and safety (Akerlof & Kranton, 
2013; Goldman, Giles, & Hogg, 2014, Hogg, Siegel, & Hohman, 2011), or contradict 
one’s private beliefs (Prentice & Miller, 1996). This is particularly so when the group 
imposes strict rules, has strong leaders, and sets clear boundaries (e.g., Weinstein, 2007). 
In short, social psychology suggests that prejudice follows a social trajectory as much as 
it may a cognitive or evaluative one. Whitehead and Stokoe (2015) argued that since 
people cannot be separated from groups, prejudice should be studied in a real-life setting 
and evaluated as the social condition that it is.  
Studies on Extreme Prejudice 
I found few studies that discussed extreme and explicit prejudice, although there 
were two interesting literature reviews (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Berger, 2016) that 
reviewed deradicalization and disengagement from violent extremism. These reviews 
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suggested that extremism cannot be remedied with popular interventions like interfaith 
groups, exercises in logic, or debate, but that members could be influenced to question 
their options by being exposed to contradictory and questionable elements of their 
cultures.  
Littman and Paluck (2014) suggested that extreme prejudice and hostility 
originate from violence-prone groups, by these groups desensitizing their citizens and 
normalizing bigotry and extremism. This explains why even ethically-minded individuals 
who grow up in such environments tend to exhibit intolerance. Dixon and colleagues 
(2014), also, negated the effect of prejudice research done by social scientists, claiming 
that these studies tended to be formulated on “lovey-dovey” ideas of peace and 
understanding and that they were mostly executed on college campuses, in regions with 
minimal conflict. Stephan (1986) reported that the prejudice intervention method of 
encounter groups not only achieved insignificant results but also harmed under certain 
conditions. Only 17% of studies of encounter groups in conflict-driven environments 
indicated a decline in prejudice, while 46% of these studies reported an increase 
(Stephan, 1986). Dixon and colleagues (2014) proposed that prejudice reduction in 
conflict regions starts with stabilizing the afflicted nation or region. Dalgaard-Nielsen 
(2013) and Berger (2016) also concluded that interventions like contact-groups or debates 
fail to reverse extremist attitudes. In short, research indicated that most prejudice-
intervention methods are questionable, with certain methods succeeding in certain 
situations but failing in others. The interventions that succeeded seemed to do so mostly 
in the “lovey dovey” context, but were defeated in conflict settings, like North Africa, the 
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Middle East or inner-city ghettos. Dixon and colleagues (2014) concluded, “We hold that 
the entire ‘problematic’ of prejudice and prejudice reduction is ripe for a careful 
reappraisal in our discipline” (p.22).  
What Is Unknown about These Issues  
The cognitive approach remains the dominant psychological approach to 
understanding and explaining discrimination, prejudice, discrimination, stereotypes, and 
conflict (e.g., Duckitt, 1992), but critics point to serious flaws. Two largely overlooked 
limitations are that the cognitive approach fails to explain individual differences in 
intergroup attitude and behavior (Condor & Brown, 1988) and that it fails to explain how 
individuals are socialized into the norms and attitudes of their group. As discussed 
earlier, the cognitive approach also focuses on a weak sort of bias, while it ignores the 
very real problems of everyday violence and hatred (e.g., Dixon et al, 2014). Third, 
prejudice is an affect-based attitude derived from real-life conditions, but the cognitive 
approach tests its assumptions under laboratory conditions (e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009).  
In their comprehensive review, Paluck and Green (2009) and Paluck (2012) rated 
most prejudice-reducing methods (these included diversity training, multicultural, anti-
bias and moral education, sensitivity training, and certain types of conflict resolution 
strategies) inconclusive. Prejudice-reducing methods somewhat more reliable were 
cooperative learning and social interdependence theory (e.g., Roseth, Johnson & Johnson, 
2008), media and entertainment interventions (built on social norms and social cognitive 
theories; e.g., Cameron et al., 2005), peer influence and discussion or dialogue programs 
based on social impact theory (Paluck, 2010), intergroup contact (e.g., Green & Wong, 
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2009), self-worth interventions connected to cognitive-dissonance and self-perception 
theory (e.g., Rokeach, 1971), and cross-cultural and intercultural training (Bhawak & 
Brislin, 2000). Paluck, (2012) and Paluck & Green (2009) reported these programs, too, 
showed contradictory results and needed to be supported with behavioral and longitudinal 
observations.  
The encounter method of diversity training, for instance, has long been promoted 
for reducing prejudice despite its propensity for attracting polemical attacks and lawsuits 
(Feder, 1994). Feder (1994) insisted that many encounter groups use methods that no 
reliable psychologist would recommend. Allport (1954) was one of many scientists who 
noted that diversity training works best under conditions where “contact is sanctioned by 
institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom or local atmosphere)” (p. 202) which makes it 
impotent for socialization of closed societies like cults. The encounter group can also fail 
to positively affect individuals traumatized by the stigmatized group (Bodenhausen, 
2009; Zarate, Sanders, & Garza, 2000). Successful group dynamics require that 
individuals of both sides be open to modifying their preconceptions. If this does not 
occur, participants may refrain from stereotyping atypical exemplars (Fiske, 2002), but 
persist in stereotyping the group. In short, the encounter group works best on challenging 
superficial impressions in conflict-free regions but fails to reverse experience or group-
derived prejudice, since affect is stronger than cognition and far more resilient to control 
(LeDoux, 1996).  
Research on other prejudice interventions, such as stereotype-suppression and 
promotion of counter-stereotypes, shows that stereotype-suppression not only fails to 
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suppress prejudice but has a reverse effect (Galinsky & Moscowitz, 2000; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). When researchers attempted to change actual belief (as, for 
instance, in Wegner and Petty’s [1997] Flexible Correction Model) participants tended to 
either ignore (Trope & Thompson, 1997), distort (Darley & Gross, 1983), forget 
(Stangor, 2009), or rationalize (Swim & Sanna, 1996) contradictory information. Some 
untested studies suggested that individuals may question their prejudice when faced with 
inconsistencies in their values, attitudes, and behaviors. Hing, Li and Zanna (2002), for 
instance, used dissonance-related techniques to reduce anti-gay, anti-Asian, and anti-
Black prejudice. But their studies were one of many that lacked conclusive evidence 
(Paluck & Green, 2009).  
Finally, I found few studies that focused on extreme prejudice. Messick and 
Mackie (1989) reported that standard prejudice-reducing interventions focus on 
superficial in-group favoritism rather than on outgroup hostility. Marilyn Brewer (1999) 
said that prejudice models focus on positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and 
trust that are reserved for the in-group, rather than on negative emotions, like hate and 
aggression, that exist in radical conditions. As Dutton and colleagues (2005) concluded 
after searching in vain for some psychological explanation for the unending inter and 
intra-group conflict in Africa: “The explanation of the specific forms of violence, rape, 
mutilation, torture, etc., is not forthcoming from current psychological knowledge [...] 
psychology has not attempted to account for the extremity of massacre” (Dutton, 
Boyanowsky, & Bond, 2005, p. 470). 
To quote Paluck (2016):  
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What do social scientists know about reducing prejudice in the world? In short, 
very little. Of the hundreds of studies on prejudice reduction conducted in recent 
decades, only 11% test the causal effect of interventions conducted in the real 
world (p. 147).  
I developed my study to address that need. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The study of prejudice is one of the most voluminous fields in social science, but 
as Paluck (2012; 2016) and Paluck and Green (2009) concluded in their reviews, 
prejudice study and its reduction must branch out substantively to include more 
qualitative real-life research. Research, too, should focus on deeply held prejudice and 
probe prejudice reduction in the context of real-life conflict. This study examined the 
experiences and attitudes of people who were raised in a “culture of conformism” and 
who independently reversed their prejudices in order to gain some insight on how to 
reduce prejudice in a real-world situation. This study used a social constructivist/ IPA 
stance, where autobiographical narratives were investigated to uncover the significance 
of the experience from the narrator’s perspective. It is hoped that the findings from this 
study will help researchers and social-change practitioners treat the deeply-held prejudice 
that comes from socialization. The following chapter outlines the methodology of the 
study, reasons for using this method, and certain ethical concerns before it concludes with 
the study’s limitations and implications. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
This study analyzed autobiographical data from digital, print, audio, and visual 
sources from 21 defectors of insular faith societies to identify core themes associated 
with their prejudice retractions. My research questions were the following:  
RQ1: What are the lived experiences of defectors of closed faith groups as they disengage 
and deradicalize?  
RQ2: What are the pathways for changing prejudice among defectors of closed faith 
groups?  
Paluck and Green (2009) noted that prejudice literature tends to neglect extreme 
prejudice and focuses on prejudice in contrived laboratory situations, rather than in real 
life settings. This study focused on people indoctrinated with extreme prejudice in 
conflict environments and used a qualitative API method to gather the participants’ 
descriptions of their experiences.  
Research Design and Rationale 
I attempted to describe the “lived experience” of 21 individuals in violent closed-
faith societies who independently reversed their socialized bias to outsiders. Paluck and 
Green (2009) pointed out that few prejudice methodologies successfully treat prejudice 
and those that do deal only with the weak to moderate bias of non-conflict regions. Most 
prejudice-reduction studies study individuals who come from White, educated, 
industrialized, rich, and democratic countries (Murrar, Gavac, and Brauer, 2016), rather 
than individuals who experience the extreme type of prejudice that researchers need to 
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study for conflict-resolution and peace. This dissertation used the phenomenological 
approach to investigate the process of how subjects in this study evolved to question their 
prejudices. I achieved this by analyzing their narratives to identify core themes of their 
experiences during their transitions from prejudice to prejudice-renunciation. The study is 
important because there are plenty of interventions that exist for treating weak to 
moderate prejudice but none for treating extreme prejudice.  
Role of the Researcher 
Scott (2006) advised researchers who conduct exploratory studies to master four 
qualities:  Authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning.  Authenticity refers 
to the accuracy of the narrative and the extent to which it matches historical reality. As 
long as the crux of the story is true, it is considered authentic, even if the narrative 
diverges from historical reality in minute aspects. Credibility refers to the extent to which 
the biographer has exaggerated, or fabricated, aspects of the account. The documentary 
researcher probes for motives of the biographer to test whether author bias distorted 
aspects of the narrative. The researcher also considers whether the material is reliable, as 
of whether writing and reflections are original or whether one, or both, are plagiarized. 
According to Scott (2006), researchers can never fully determine whether narratives are 
completely reliable, authentic, and credible. The best one can do is flip the interrogation 
and question whether the sources can be considered inauthentic, noncredible, or 
unrepresentative. The fourth quality, “meaning”, refers to a clear and coherent descriptive 
authentically aligned to its historical context.  
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McCullough (2004) described a “theorization” stance, where the researcher uses a 
theoretical, hermeneutic framework for interpreting the material. Effective researchers 
realize the way they interpret the material follows their unique experiences and may 
differ considerably from the author’s intent. In other words, the author composed the 
descriptive from his, or her, unique perspective; the reader, in this case the researcher, 
interpreted the narrative from the researcher’s unique perspective. The two different 
perspectives may result in utterly different understandings.  Scott (2006) described three 
phases where the meaning of the reading changes as it passes from writer to reader: The 
transition of the intended content (i.e., the author’s intended meaning), the received 
content (i.e., the meaning as constructed by the reader/perceiver), and the internal 
meaning (i.e., transactional understandings derived from the intended and received 
meanings).  Recipients align the intended meaning to their own mental constructs.  
Methodology 
This study used an interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) that is a 
qualitative research method derived from the philosophical model of phenomenology. 
Phenomenology advises researchers to see experience as-is, namely in its core essence. It 
is also seen as the philosophical study of being, or existentialism. Researchers use the 
phenomenological research methodology for descriptive or theoretical purposes. This 
model is divided into two parts: Transcendental phenomenology that seeks to bracket or 
suspend one’s interpretations, and descriptive phenomenology, influenced by thinkers 
like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who alleged that humans are ontologically disabled 
from bracketing their assumptions. According to descriptive phenomenology, the best 
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one can do is to acknowledge one’s bias, seek to describe the phenomenon in its raw 
manifestations, and replicate its truth. This position is often called hermeneutic 
phenomenology, since it aims to interpret rather than to transcend assumptions (Larkin & 
Thompson, 2011).  
I chose IPA because it starts with the essence of the experience rather than with 
the individual. Larkin and Thompson (2011) said IPA accomplishes “a meaning-making 
that is conceptualized at the level of the person-in-context where we focus first on the 
meaning of an experience (e.g., an event, process or relationship) to a given participant, 
and recognize its significance for that participant” (p. 102). This idiographic approach 
suited my purpose, since I was interested in the experiences that inspired my particular 
subjects to retract their prejudice convictions. I also chose IPA, because it is commonly 
used in mental health and therapy to study toxic attitudes that range from depression to 
identity confusion (e.g., Smith and Osborn, 2007). Smith (2004) pointed out that IPA 
studies frequently assess life-altering events, decisions, or conditions around existential 
themes, which resonates with my dissertation.   
Conceptual Framework 
I used social constructivism as my theoretical base to bracket my bias. Social 
constructivism assumes that “there is no objective knowledge independent of thinking” 
(Grbich, 2007, p. 8) and that reality is socially embedded and exclusively exists in the 
mind. I tried to hedge my assumptions and to concentrate on the text to retrieve the 
essence of what it was that made my subjects change their attitudes. Grbich (2007) 
claimed that the constructivist approach works well with studies that have characteristics 
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of ethnography in that these studies involve “thick contextualized description and textual 
perusal using discourse analysis” (p. 8).  
Sample and Sources of Data  
According to Clarke (2009), IPA studies achieve credibility even with small 
sample sizes and the number of participants is reached when the analysis becomes 
saturated. Sometimes, saturation, as in my case, may never be reached, so I relied on 
Pietkiewicz and Smith (2014), who averaged the number of participants needed in IPA 
models at 15 (although the trend is towards smaller sample sizes, such as eight to ten 
individuals, with some IPA studies even declining to as few as four participants or even 
to just one (Smith and Osborn, 2003). I settled for 21 case studies, although I came across 
many more relevant accounts both before and while doing my research.  
I used print and digital reports of writers who come from isolated faith 
communities, where there was a certain taught intolerance to outsiders. Communities 
included Jehovah Witness, Old World Amish (Old Order), extreme Muslim groups (like 
Wahhabi or Salafi ideology), Haredi or Hassidic Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Mormon 
fundamentalism (FLDS Church), Christian fundamentalism (like Kingdom Identity 
Ministries, Pentecostalism, or some Baptist and Evangelical fundamentalist groups), and 
the Official Church of Scientology. Although the content of their education differed 
between communities, a common denominator in their education was that teaching was 
tied to the community and a spectrum of methods was used to raise barriers against the 
outside world. Most of these communities imposed restrictions related to contact with the 
outside. Censorship included limiting, if not banning, TV, radio, books, magazines, 
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newspapers, movies and computers. The result inhibited members of such societies from 
forming their own opinions. These are the subjects whose narratives I investigated. 
Instrumentation 
In our capacities as researchers, my assistant and I served as the instruments for 
data collection. The narratives and background context of my subjects helped me 
formulate questions and generate themes. I used an interpretive paradigm to investigate 
the lived experiences of the subjects during all stages of their journeys. I also engaged the 
assistance of an objective individual (a qualified student with no prior knowledge of my 
research or reading) to replicate my reading and coding process, after which we identified 
and resolved differences in our results.  
I used a purposive sample of autobiographical texts that were compiled from 
archival resources of print material from libraries, universities and colleges in six 
countries and four US states. I also used digital audio and visual resources, as well as 
material from chat groups, forums, and social media platforms (like Facebook). My 
demographics spanned various extremist closed faith societies that indoctrinate their 
members with intolerance and hostility to outsiders.  
Procedures for Recruitment, Participant and Data Collection 
I selected only subjects who were raised from birth in these isolated faith settings, 
since I sought to discover why and how those individuals who lacked contact with a 
wider world reversed their indoctrinations. For the same reason, I chose individuals 
whose societies imposed an extreme form of censorship and who came from radically 
isolated groups. Because I wanted to investigate extreme prejudice, I also chose closed 
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societies where this attitude was part of their cultures. I, therefore, used Malise’s (2004) 
definition of extremism to exclude certain isolated, although peaceful, groups, like 
Hutterites and Mennonites, from my study.  
Additionally, I focused on “push” rather than “pull” features. Research suggests 
that “push” and “pull” features effect disengagement and deradicalization (or exit from 
groups) (e.g., Reckless, 1961). “Pull” features are qualities outside of the group that 
attract, while “push” factors are adverse characteristics of the group that repulse 
(McAdam, 1986). Even though “push” and “pull” factors are integrated (without the 
“push”, the “pull” would not seem so inviting and the reverse (McAdam, 1986)), I 
focused on the “push” rather than on the “pull” to investigate motives for exit.  
Data Analysis Plan 
I closely reviewed each narrative, highlighting relevant excerpts and taking notes. 
I followed each reading with a summary of the account. These I collated and condensed, 
before I matched this summary against my original readings to verify whether my 
assumptions correctly captured the intent, or lived experience, of the original texts. This 
step is said to be the essence of IPA (e.g., Polkinghorne, 1989), where the researcher 
moves between inductive and deductive positions and places subthemes under 
superordinate categories.  I also reproduced Willig’s (2001) four stages of initial 
encounter with the text, identification of themes, clustering of themes, and final summary 
of these themes. I verified that my summary accurately reflected experiences that could 
be applied to the group as a whole.  
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On top of that, I used social constructivism to bracket my bias and to enter the 
mindset of the other. This required the approaches of bracketing, analyzing, intuiting, and 
describing (Giorgi, 1970; Polkinghorne, 1989; Swanson, Kauffman & Schonwald, 1988). 
Although each of these are separate items of descriptive phenomenology, I consistently 
used the practice of all four to achieve a true understanding of the phenomenon under 
study (Swanson-Kauffman & Schonwald, 1988).  
Bracketing involved constantly monitoring my perceptions and bias and was 
accomplished by taking “field notes” on my emotions and thoughts and using an 
assistant. Analyzing was where I used five items of Colaizzi’s (1978) seven-step method 
to guide my phenomenological analysis. More specifically, I reviewed the participants’ 
descriptions of the phenomenon at least twice to understand their accounts and to attempt 
to “live” their experiences. I extracted core statements from the narratives that seemed to 
encapsulate the phenomenon.  I suggested possible meanings for significant statements. I 
categorized these meanings into clusters of themes common to each of the narratives, and 
I summarized these themes into an exhaustive description of the studied phenomenon. 
I used the aspect of “intuiting”, a form of empathy (Colaizzi, 1978), to bracket my 
perceptions, identity with the narrator’s experiences and feelings, and try to immerse 
myself in their context for maximum identification. “Describing” was where I sought to 
present a theoretical model that accurately and precisely summarized the phenomenon 
under study and present universal implications (Colaizzi, 1978). Finally, I concluded with 
the “data collection/clustering” stage, where I collated units of meaning from the texts 
into particular themes (Sadala & Adorno, 2002) to elicit meanings from the studied 
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phenomenon. Colaizzi (1978) pointed out that this step may be the most creative of all, 
since it involves a creative leap on the part of the researcher who deduces assumptions 
from given excerpts.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
My study included various questionable assumptions. First, I assumed that I can 
extract certain insights from my limited population, although it is highly likely that a 
larger autobiographical pool may produce different or contradictory indicators. Second, 
autobiography lacks truth status (Trochim, 2006), which makes my study questionable 
from the start. Third, I focused on socialized prejudice, ignoring the type of prejudice that 
comes from traumatized experiences, such as terrorism (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001). This 
means that my inferences may only relate to indoctrinated prejudice and have little to no 
effect on the kind of extreme prejudice that originates from other factors.  
Although quantitative research is, generally, considered more reliable than 
qualitative research, scientists recommend qualitative methodology for studying affect 
and human behavior. As Cameron (1963) stated, “Not everything that can be counted 
counts, and not everything that counts can be counted” (p. 3). I, therefore, used a 
qualitative method for my study. Finally, as Yin (1994) noted, document analysis 
engenders a “biased selectivity”, where the researcher tends to select documents that 
support his viewpoint and reflect her beliefs. I may have fallen into that trap, too, despite 






The IRB identifies exemptions for research that consists of a collection of existing 
data that is publicly available. Since my research used publicly accessible data and did 
not involve actual human participants, I violated no issue of confidentiality or privacy.  
Summary 
This chapter described the research methodology. My study used an IPA approach 
to probe autobiographical accounts from multiple individuals raised in isolated faith 
communities who independently reversed their socialized intolerance. The methodology 
used social constructivism to bracket, analyze, intuit, and highlight key clusters of the 




Chapter 4: Results  
Chapter 4 shows how defectors from closed faith societies chose to retract their 
indoctrinated prejudicial attitudes, despite being penalized for doing so.  Each of the 
defectors, whose accounts will be analyzed in this chapter, came from strongly cohesive 
societies, also called “closed faith societies”, where pressure to conform was so intense 
that their cultures formed their identities.  
Sociological literature suggests that most participants of extremely controlling 
religious or political groups have self-annihilating connections to their groups (e.g., Leary 
& Baumeister, 1995).  Isolated and socialized in these groups as they are, I wondered 
how certain participants recognize the toxicity of their indoctrinations. I also wondered 
what compelled these individuals to renounce their attitudes, knowing that they would be 
punished for doing so. This chapter examines 21 such individuals, some of whom were 
leaders in their groups. Several of these individuals participated in jihad and violence. 
Many lost their spouses, close family, friends, and even children over their defections. 
Most were unacquainted with world outside their communities. Some lost their jobs and 
savings after rejecting their group’s bias. I wondered whether I could identify a pattern in 
these renunciation accounts for understanding and dealing with extreme prejudice in real 
life settings.  
Most prejudice studies are conducted on campus settings in conflict-free 
environments, making the results irrelevant to real-life situations (e.g., Paluck & Green, 
2009). Most methods seem unsuitable for serious prejudice intervention (e.g., Paluck & 
Green, 2009). Third, prejudice research focuses on weak to moderate bias and neglects 
40 
 
extreme prejudice (e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009). This study sought to investigate extreme 
prejudice in a conflict-filled real-life context.  
Positionality  
I chose social constructivism for my theoretical approach to monitor and hedge 
my bias. According to Grbich (2007), social constructivism assumes that “there is no 
objective knowledge independent of thinking” (p. 8). This study has been a product of 
more than 30 years of reading, reflection, personal experience and interviews with former 
members of obedience-demanding, or closed faith enclaves, prompted by my own 
experiences of leaving an isolated faith community that applauded and practiced 
violence. I have also conducted wide and intensive reading on multidisciplinary and 
related topics, more specifically on epistemology, ethnopsychology, religion, history, 
anthropology, sociology, and advanced mathematics, along with my Master’s in 
philosophy and advanced logics. I interviewed and worked with cults (e.g., Hari Krishna, 
the Moonies), interviewed, taught, counseled, and worked with aspiring and actual 
terrorists (e.g., Zionist and Palestinian) in the Middle East, interviewed, counseled, and 
taught Neo-Nazis as well as former-communists (Hungary, Moldavia, Ukraine) and 
regularly experience Trumpism, white supremacism and confederate loyalty in parts of 
North Virginia and environs. My experiences gave me a unique insider perspective to this 
study but also made me a subjective researcher, which is why I labored all the harder to 





Summary of Participants 
I used criterion sampling for my study, choosing only participants who grew up in 
isolated faith communities. Participants came from backgrounds that included Jehovah 
Witness, Old World Amish (Old Order), extreme Muslim groups (like Wahhabi or Salafi 
ideology), Haredi or Hassidic Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Mormon fundamentalism (FLDS 
Church), Christian fundamentalism (like Kingdom Identity Ministries, Pentecostalism, or 
some Baptist and Evangelical fundamentalist groups), and the Official Church of 
Scientology. A common denominator in their education was their ties to their 
communities and the spectrum of methods used to raise strong barriers against the outside 
world. According to Hammersborg (2005), insular faith communities establish an 
understanding of “they” and “we”, where not even close relatives are part of the “we” if 
they exist outside the community. Such communities generate fear of everything outside. 
Children know that breaking out will result in severance from family and friends. 
Defectors run the risk of being despised, excommunicated, and losing their footholds in 
their communities (Hammersborg, 2005).  
Some of these communities restrict contact with the outside, to the extent that 
they ban outlets that include TV, radio, libraries, secular reading material, movies, and 
internet. Former participants described it as "You are even not allowed to have free 
thoughts” (Hammersborg, 2005, p.5). The result is a climate of growing up without 
exposure to the “outside” world or the possibility for normal opinion forming, which 




These are their biographies: 
• Amir Ahmad Nasr - Nasr’s account in My Isl@m (2013), describes how the 
internet transformed Nasr from a religious fundamentalist upbringing to a tech-
savvy liberal Muslim.  
• Ruth Irene Garrett - Crossing Over: One Woman's Escape from Amish Life (2003) 
describes how Garrett grew up in and left her strict Old Order Amish sect. 
• Alisa Harris - In Raised Right: How I Untangled My Faith from Politics (2011), 
Harris spent her childhood picketing abortion clinics and was homeschooled in 
conservative-Republican Christianity but considered other perspectives when she 
moved into adulthood. 
• Ayaan Hirsi - Hirsi, a Somali-born Dutch-American activist, feminist, author, 
scholar, and former Dutch politician, spent the first 21 years of her life in an 
extreme Muslim environment. Her writings include Nomad: From Islam to 
America: A Personal Journey through the Clash of Civilizations (2011); Infidel 
(2007); Heretic: Why Islam Needs a Reformation Now (2016); The Caged Virgin: 
An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (2008). 
• Jenna Miscavige Hill - Hill, niece of Church of Scientology leader David 
Miscavige, left Scientology in 2005. In Beyond Belief: My Secret Life inside 
Scientology (2013), she details her experiences as a member of Sea Org - the 
church's highest ministry and tells the story of her escape. 
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• Kyria Abrahams - I'm Perfect, You're Doomed: Tales from a Jehovah's Witness 
(2010) is the story of Abrahams’ coming-of-age in, and defection from, Jehovah's 
Witness. 
• Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out (2003) is written and edited by ex-Muslim 
and secularist Ibn Warraq. The book documents more than 100 cases of apostasy 
in Islam. 
• Sonsyrea Tate - Little X: Growing Up In The Nation Of Islam (2005) tells the 
story of Tate whose growing disillusionment with the Nation of Islam led to her 
break with the Muslim religion. 
• Rachel Held-Evans; Evolving in Monkey Town: How a Girl Who Knew All the 
Answers Learned to Ask the Questions (2010) - Growing up in a Christian 
fundamentalist culture obsessed with apologetics, Held-Evans asked questions she 
never thought she would ask. 
• Carlene Cross - In Fleeing Fundamentalism: A Minister's Wife Examines Faith 
(2006), Cross, a minister’s wife, questions the underpinnings of her 
fundamentalist faith.  
• Yossi Klein-Halevi; Memoirs of a Jewish Extremist: The Story of a 
Transformation (2014) - An award-winning Israeli journalist recounts his youth as 
an activist in the Jewish terrorist Kach movement, and his eventual moderation 
and advocacy of Jewish-Gentile reconciliation. 
44 
 
• Shulem Deen - In All Who Go Do Not Return (2015), Deen recounts how he grew 
up in an insular Hassidic sect, was raised to know little about the outside world, 
and soon found his faith unravelling. 
• Ed Husain; The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw 
Inside and Why I Left (2007) is Husain’s account of how he committed his life to 
Islamic fundamentalism and rejected it five years later to expose its threat. 
• Maajid Nawaz - Maajid Nawaz founded Quilliam, a globally active think tank 
focusing on religious freedom, extremism and integration. Radical: My Journey 
out of Islamist Extremism (2012) describes the journey of Nawaz from top 
recruiter for Hizb ut-Tahrir to dissident. 
• Shoshi - Shoshi grew up in and rebelled against a radically insulated Hasidic 
community. Her story comes from OffTheDerech, a website that interviews ex-
Hassids. 
• Anonymous - In “A moment that changed me: quitting the Jehovah’s Witnesses” 
(The Guardian, 2016), Anonymous describes how she left Jehovah Witness and 
questioned her ideas and beliefs. 
• Vyckie Garrison - Garrison, former leader in the Quiverfull Movement, describes 
her deconversion in “It happened to me: I escaped the ‘Quiverfull’ fundamentalist 
Christian cult” (xoJane, 2014). 
• Derek Black - A former white nationalist, godson of David Duke. Black is also 
the son of Don Black, grand-wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, founder of the notorious 
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white nationalist website, Stormfront. Black recounted his deconversion 
experiences in “The white flight of Derek Black” (The Washington Post, 2016). 
• Dan Barker - The Purple Fox (YouTube, 2010). Barker, popular leader in the 
Church of Christ, wrestled his faith, before he deconverted to atheism. 
• Christian Charette; From Fundamentalism to Freedom: My Story (2013). 
Christian Charette, son of a Christian fundamentalist minister, and leader of 
various churches, defected to urge tolerance for all faiths. 
• Joel Watts, author of the blog Unsettled Christianity - Watts grew up in The 
Church of Jesus Christ. A fire-and-brimstone preacher and self-described Bible-
thumper, he left the church after 32 years and speaks out on the dangers of 
repressive and rigid fundamentalist teachings. His interview appeared in 
Innerviews: Spiritual saga traces break from fundamentalist church (Charleston 
Gazette-Mail, 2014). 
Data Coding 
Bazeley (2009) warned of the unremitting struggle to achieve objectivity that 
starts from the data collection stage itself, where I may choose accounts to match my 
agenda. I followed Bazeley’s (2009) recommendations to focus on the context of the text, 
its layers of description, the substance of the story related to my search, and to monitor 
my ruminations.  
I used Saldana’s (2015) four methods for coding, namely, attribute coding, 
emotion coding, value coding, and narrative coding. Attribute coding identifies essential 
information on the data and demographic characteristics of the participants. Emotion 
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coding focuses on the emotions of the participants. Value coding investigates patterns in 
belief statements or belief occurrences. Narrative coding searches for patterns in 
individual narratives and in the narratives as a whole. I followed Bazeley’s (2009) 
process of “feedback loops”, where I immersed myself in the narrative, and read each 
account twice, concentrating on the second reading. This was followed by a third reading, 
where I used Saldana's (2015) second-cycle coding methods, of “pattern coding” and 
“focused coding”, to extract themes. I used “pattern coding” to examine my codes for 
connections, following which I clustered these connections, or themes, and used “focused 
coding” to summarize the results.  
My associate conducted her own research producing her own conclusions. I 
merged her themes with mine. The whole took one month of closely focused reading on 
my part. (I had read most of the material in the past, so I was familiar with the 
narratives). My associate spent almost three months reading the material and replicating 
my methods. As each of us separately read the accounts, we looked for themes, 
highlighted sections, and took notes of our reflections. We summarized our reflections 
and findings before we proceeded to the next account. At the end, we collated the whole, 
reviewed it for sense-meaning and contrasted it to the original narratives, before we 
drafted a rough summary, as described above. Subsequent drafts were composed and 
edited, until my associate and I agreed that our final production matched the accounts and 
seemed to satisfy our research questions. 
In the course of my study, I identified 291 statements that seemed to be 
significant. I divided these statements into 15 categories, reduced to four clusters or 
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themes. My associate thought a motivational category should be added, by which she 
meant the affective (emotional) domain of psychology, but I rejected that idea, since I 
considered affect too vague, variant, and unpredictable and sought something specific 
that people who deal with bigotry could use that transcends cultures and time. Second, 
participates of cloistered groups may be driven to rebel for natural reasons like love or 
sex or to escape abuse. I sought Hunsberger and Altemeyer’s (1995) “amazing apostates” 
who defied their groups for cognitive reasons, so that social scientist could replicate my 
results. 
Emerging Themes 
My IPA research led to four core themes that seemed to describe the phenomenon 
under investigation. The first theme I called “As-Is”, where the beliefs of my subjects 
collided with reality, and where “reality” was am incident discordant to their convictions. 
In all cases, the phenomenon was marked by an abrupt cessation of faith that tended to 
occur unexpectedly and against their wills.  Those who encountered this phenomenon and 
sought truth, retracted their prejudiced indoctrinations. I called the second theme critical 
thinking, where subjects conducted analytical reading of their core texts to resolve doubts 
and/or to proselytize. Jarring encounters with discordant text challenged their beliefs. My 
third theme was wide reading, where subjects recounted analyzing core multidisciplinary 
texts from subjects like history, anthropology, sociology or comparative religion and 
found that facts challenged convictions. Finally, I added a fourth theme of altruism, 
where an outsider’s generosity contradicted stereotypes of demonization held by the 
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subject’s particular group. Although this theme has evaluative shadowing’s, I included it 
because of its cognitive component where the subject ruminated on their experiences.  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
According to Yin (2003), researchers who conduct exploratory studies need to 
master the four qualities of authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. 
Authenticity refers to reflecting on the truth of the document and on whether it accurately 
conveys the broader story of the author, even as nuances diverge from reality. I relied on 
eyewitness testimony, publishing house credibility, and reviews to verify authenticity. 
The second quality of credibility is whether the author exaggerated or fabricated one or 
more details. I relied on the sources stated above for narrative credibility, although I 
allowed for certain points of distortion. Third was whether the material was “reliable”, in 
whether it was plagiarized, or accurately reflected the author’s perceived experiences. 
 Since one can never fully determine whether documents are completely reliable, 
authentic, and credible, I followed Scott (2006) prescription and questioned whether the 
sources were inauthentic, non-credible, or unrepresentative. I judged them neither of 
these for the reasons given above. 
Finally, the quality of “meaning” rests on whether the evidence is clear and 
comprehensible, and on the authenticity of its historical and geographical context. 
Although my experience is limited to only one close faith group, I have spoken to 




My study is limited in its transferability in that it is based on various questionable 
assumptions. First, a larger population would likely have produced additional, varying or 
contradictory results. Second, autobiography lacks truth status (Trochim, 2006), which 
makes my study questionable from the start. Third, my population reflect extreme 
prejudice from socialization, while extreme prejudice also derives from trauma (Bar-Tal 
& Labin, 2001), possibly rendering the implications of my study irrelevant to atypical 
exemplars.  
The Themes 
Theme 1: As-Is 
I see this “As-Is” theme as the overarching theme, where the subject had his or 
her belief system shaken in an unexpected encounter with a threat to their convictions. 
This “As-Is” encounter could also be described as a phenomenological occurrence, where 
the perceiver came face-to-face with the actual and had his or her “eyes opened.” Many 
of the subjects used expressions that indicated as much. Garett (2003), for instance, said 
“My mind was a tornado. [After] that moment I felt as though I had been flying blind for 
years” (p. 20).  Cross (2006) described her studies as a light that broke through “the fog” 
(p. 131). Hirsi (2005) said the religious and cultural contradictions confused her “she 
couldn't see straight” (p. 32). Later, she said “the “little shutter” in the back of her brain 
opened and thoughts came tumbling out (p. 104). Held-Evans (2010) only knew that 
“sometime in my late teens or early twenties, it was as if Jesus packed his bags and 
moved from my heart into her head” (p. 105).  
50 
 
Held-Evans’ faith-infused content of Jesus representing “faith”, heart”, or “spirit” 
changed to a Jesus of “atonement”, “logos”, “the object [italics mine] of my faith”, and 
“absolute truth”. The first are effective descriptions, the last are cognitive terms. She, 
also, noted that “[Jesus] was something I agreed to, not someone I followed” (p. 105). I 
noted the conversion of subject, “someone I followed”, into object, “something I agreed 
to”.  
Anonymous (2003) described how her faith was impacted by her critical reading 
of the Quran. Once done, “I found myself standing face-to-face with the truth” (p. 148) - 
an intimate encounter, not protected from denial. She elaborated: “The denial acts as a 
shield that covers [believers], that protects them and that saves them from facing the pain 
of shock and disillusionment. Once that shield is up nothing can break it down.” (p. 148). 
What believers need, Anonymous (2003) insisted “is a good shock.” Think of shock in its 
literal sense as a force that jolts individuals into encounter with the feared unknown. 
 “Shocks are used by doctors to bring back to life clinically dead patients.” (p. 148). 
Further: “The word faith means belief without evidence,” You need, she says, “to 
bombard Muslims with ‘facts’” (p. 149). I called this category, the “As-Is”.  
The triggers were unpredictable, largely unsought for and unavoidable. In The 
Purple Fox, Barker (2010) described an Evangelical woke of all-day singing and Church 
Prayer Meeting, with thousands of Church youth participating from all over the United 
States. At some point, he disassociated from himself and saw himself as just someone 
playing a guitar to entertain the crowd. As he suddenly saw it, it was the instruments, not 
the Spirit of God, as he had believed, that spurred crowd epiphany. 
51 
 
Deen (2015) recounted his Hasidic experiences and how for the first time he saw 
God’s Ambassador as human. In Deen’s (2015) words, each Passover, Hasidim would 
compare the number of seconds the rabbi wept and analyze the smallest signs of 
spontaneity: “The rabbi wept this year more than last” (p. 15). They argued over the 
milliseconds: “this year he wept only once, but for a twenty-three second stretch” (p. 15) 
- all this to mine for some hidden meaning of mysticism, some tip for self-improvement, 
some secret message from the Rebbe that was supposed to have infinities of significance. 
One Passover, Deen (2015) watched how followers crawled the rafters and 
pushed to get nearer to the diminutive man sipping his soup at the head of the table. Deen 
reflected:  
[That] day, I began to wonder. Where exactly was the Rebbe’s greatness? Was he 
a scholar? Was he a saint? Had he ever shown anyone any exceptional kindness? 
How would one even know it, considering that he was barely accessible to his 
followers, his acts so meticulously scripted, his public utterances limited to 
carefully prepared thoughts of little consequence, private audiences always brief 
and perfunctory, five minute consultation after a five-hour wait. (p. 15)  
Deen’s (2015) ruminations seemed a perfect example of As-Is, where he reduced 
myth to empirical occurrence. Deen says:  
I thought about the Rebbes of other sects – so many of them, of late consumed by 
squabbles. The squabbles were often coated in veneers of piety, but the 
differences were rarely matters of principle or ideology. They were about power 
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and control. And real estate. Millions of dollars in properties and institutions and 
the great communal wealth amassed by each sect. (pp. 15-16) 
The extraordinariness of this reflection is that it was done by someone dedicated 
to his rabbi with no access to outside material or outside knowledge for contrast. (Deen 
lacked radio, libraries, the internet, a fundamental education). In contrast, Deen’s wife, 
Gitty, chose faith over fact. “Our Rebbe,” she insisted, “was not to be questioned. I was 
taught to have faith in the righteous” (p. 16). Again, Deen used As-Is to challenge his 
wife’s response: 
What did it mean to have faith in the righteous? Was it to have faith in their very 
righteousness? There was something maddeningly circular about that – how did 
one know if they were righteous enough to have faith in? By faith? (p. 16). 
Hirsi’s (2007) As-Is moment came when she saw Holland for the first time and 
saw that contrary to what she ha been taught, the Dutch were happier, healthier, and more 
functional than her own culture in all ways. Says Hirsi (2007):  
The streets were clean, the shopfronts gleamed, no potholes, no lecherous men 
called me to bed with them. No Brotherhood members threatened women with 
hellfire. No homeless.  No slums, no people who lived on top of one another. No 
government corruption… I remember thinking ‘This is amazing, how can it be 
so?’ I felt I had been thrown into another world. I was Alice in Wonderland. 
(Infidel, 2007, p. 185) 
Hirsi’s rebellion shows the As-Is each step of the way. When ten, she wondered 
why she should convert Christians, if Allah had destined them for hell. By 17, she 
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wondered why Muslims had to attack non-Muslims for a religious state, if Allah was 
omnipotent. And if God were all-merciful, why were women victimized?   
Hill (2005) described her boyfriend’s break with the Church of Scientology, after 
he was shunned, despite Church teachings that God forgave repentant sinners. “Dallas,” 
she remembered, “was in disbelief. The contradictions of the Church were on full 
display; perhaps more clearly than ever before he saw how the Church said one thing and 
meant another” (p. 501). Other As-Is events included how both were startled to discover 
that few outsiders had heard of Church of Scientology founder, L. Ron Hubbard, contrary 
to what they had been taught, and that most outsiders were kind and good. When it came 
to watching TV for the first time:  
I found myself a bit surprised that what I saw didn’t match what I'd learned in 
Scientology. We were taught that homosexuals were perverts and hostile... 
However, when I watched these guys on television they didn't strike me as any of 
those things. (p. 517) 
Similarly, Held-Evans (2010) described how one Mormon missionary said: “I 
guess after you spend so much time in another country, you start to realize how similar 
everyone really is, how there’s not that much difference between us” (p. 84). The 
Muslims they encountered considered themselves God’s Elect and tool for spreading the 
Truth, just as they, the Mormons, did. Said Held-Evans (2010): “The guy who pushed a 
button somewhere and blew up my vehicle - the guys [who were] brought up in an alien 
faith and taught to kill themselves or blow himself up at checkpoints” (p. 84). “Most of 
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them, too,” she reflected, “are doing just what they sincerely believe to be God’s will. 
Most are just as passionate and screwed up as the rest of us.” (p. 84).  
In Held-Evans (2010), a missionary friend reflected: 
I’ve gotten to know some Muslims pretty well and that’s really changed my 
perspective. They're not all violent fundamentalists. They don't all hate America. 
In fact, the Muslim guy that helped me learn Arabic is a heck of a lot more 
devoted to his faith than most Christians I know. … It’s hard for me to say ‘Hey, 
you're going to hell because you didn't grow up in a Christian home like me.’ (p. 
85)  
This As-Is incident was compounded by others, where Held-Evans (2010) saw 
innocent children killed and was tormented that their Jesus-believing killers would enter 
paradise while their victims were for hell. After reading Anne Frank’s diary, she wrote 
“For weeks, I prayed diligently for Anne’s departed soul” (p. 92).  
To Yossi Klein-Halevi (2014), it was his non-Jewish girlfriend who perplexed 
him. If all non-Jews hated Jews as his culture said, how come she had never heard of 
Jews and how was it she liked him despite his Jewishness? “My father had warned me 
that a gentile woman would betray her Jewish lover in their first fight, calling him ‘dirty 
Jew’. Lyn and I sometimes fought, but my father was wrong” (p. 206). Another time, a 
homeless person who was Irish, told him he had fought for Israel in 1948. Klein-Halevi 
was nonplussed: “What was a non-Jew doing fighting for Israel instead of fighting to 
destroy it” (p. 301). In time, Klein-Halevi (2014) wondered whether the Jews were as 
friendless as his community had told him, and “whether the ‘righteous Gentiles’ as we 
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condescendingly called our allies, were really rare exceptions” (p. 200). Culminated 
doubts from these As-Is encounters led to his leaving the terrorist Kahane Chai (Kach) 
group.  
Klein-Halevi wasn't the only one disturbed by contradictions between teachings 
and reality. Husain (2007) pondered why his non-Muslim university teachers showed 
genuine concern when they discussed Islam. The Hizb had insisted that university 
professors criticized Islam. Husain (2007) noted, “The exceptionally friendly Professor 
Judd, [and others] openly discussing the merits of Muslim identity in British India and 
the exploitation of these sentiments by egotistical politicians… hardly conformed to that 
stereotype” (p. 158). 
Abrahams (2010) was told that gentiles who included people like Mother Theresa, 
the Dalai Lama, or Elie Wiesel, would go to hell. It confounded her that one of her 
Gentile friends, who was so ordinary “[she] liked Tears for Fears, button candy and 
making prank calls” (p. 32) could be a bad influence. As she saw it, there were people in 
her community who abused their children, beat their wives, connived, and drank. How 
were these people holy and Mother Theresa evil? Further As-Is questions, like these, 
corroded her convictions. Tate (2005), too, was oppressed by these same observations, 
where certain white people seemed better, kindlier, and more honest than some of her 
Muslim Brotherhood teachers. Her teachers taught her that God wanted her to use all her 
talents, while at the same time He only wanted her to be an obedient wife and mother. 
Anomalies like these confused her. 
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To Shoshi of OffTheDerech, it was “Little incidents of non-Jews being kind, 
something we were told they weren’t, or my finger staying intact after accidentally 
turning the light on Shabbos, not dying after eating candy on Yom Kippur (fast day), 
etc.” (n.d., online). She also mentioned being disturbed by hypocrisy, something that 
appears in many of my narratives. It seems to me that hypocrisy may be reduced to the 
same As-Is concept, where the defector notices that parent, teacher, or respected 
members of the community violate what they preach. There is a misalignment between 
teaching (where all are said to be holy or to tread a certain path) and fact (where deeds 
negate doctrine). 
I noticed this phenomena with Deen (2015), where Deen was disturbed by 
incidents where community members, including the Rebbe, perpetrated acts that 
contradicted their teachings. One time, some followers burned the possessions of a 
“questionable” student. Another time, they torched the home of someone who chose 
another rabbi. Some followers stoned lost non-Jewish drivers. As Deen (2015) came into 
contact with the world, he noticed that both religious and secular Jews outside his group 
knew more about Judaism than he. The world was more varied, Jews more diverse, 
practicing Jews were not all Chassidic as his rabbis, or sect, had told him. “I soon 
discovered a world of people entirely different from anyone I knew” (p. 128). This, 
among other incidents, “shattered the narrative he had been given” (p. 128). 
Later, I came across two other incidents of As-Is that fit the conditions of the 
research. The first occurred in the 2014 Lifetime movie Outlaw Prophet: Warren Jeffs. In 
the 1970s, Jeffs started his own isolated Mormon polygamous sect of about 50 followers, 
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where members were taught to distrust outsiders and all followers were ordered to kill 
those their Prophet instructed them to. One of the group’s Apostles reneged when he 
noticed that events turned out differently from the Prophet’s prophecy. He thought: If the 
Prophet erred this time, how often had he erred in the past. The man left to direct cult 
deprogramming programs. 
The second account is from Taylor (2017) who described her defection from her 
fundamentalist Church on her blog, “I Dare You": 
I was sitting in my high school homeroom listening to morning devotions when 
the name Bill Gothard was introduced and his ten rules for marriage were 
pronounced “Biblical.” I remember my shy, yet outraged hand flying into the air 
as if propelled by something more than nerves and muscles. “Where are these 
rules in the Bible? This should not be called a Bible study,” I demanded. I went 
home, disgusted. (para. 5) 
Taylor (2017) took “Biblical” literally. As she saw it, the Bible omitted Gothard’s rules, 
therefore they could not be called Biblical. If Gothard was wrong here, his other 
teachings could be wrong, too. These are examples of the As-Is theme, where the subject 
encountered hard events or facts that shook their convictions. 
Sub-theme One: Critical thinking  
Certain subjects seemed to lose their faiths after a concentrated reading of primary 
sources. Anonymous (2016), for instance, remarked:  
I’m grateful every day for my education and my desire to learn and think 
independently, a skill that fostered in me those initial doubts about Jehovah’s 
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Witnesses, and enabled me to have the strength to search for answers elsewhere in 
unbiased literature. (para. 8) 
In other words, her training to analyze texts eventually corroded her bias.  
Anonymous (2003) described how he read the Quran in English and was rattled 
by the results. He was, as he said “the typical religious fundamentalist, trapped in my 
own world of conspiracies; the Jews are behind everything” (p. 15). A chance encounter 
with an online group of Muslims caused him to read the Koran in English: 
Prior to joining this organization, I hadn't read the Koran in English, instead 
reading it in Arabic (believing this would bring me Swaab - blessings). When I 
read it for the first time, I became very worried by the amount of violence in the 
texts. Subsequent late night sessions with the Koran convinced me that I was 
reading a text to war. (p. 127) 
Nasr (2013) self-imposed project included studying Islamic history and analyzing 
Koranic and Hadeira verses. He read the religious texts in English instead of in rote 
Arabic: 
I was dumbstruck. Is this really what Islam says about fellow human beings? Is 
this truly what my love stands for and advocates? I dug into the Quranic verses 
that supposedly said Jews were ’turned’ into pigs and apes … The interpretation 
varied (p. 108) 
Anonymous (2003) cited an ex-Muslim who said that: 
My apostasy against Islam came about through a sustained critical analysis of the 
fundamental tenets of all regions, thus opening the way towards self-criticism. … 
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It slowly dawned on me that the Koran was not the infallible, immutable word of 
God, but a fascist slur on humanity, a human document with little relevance to the 
modern condition as well as the realization of the countless contradictions, 
historical inconsistencies and errors and some of the most intolerant verses ever 
written. (p. 209) 
Husain (2007) found his religious doubts deepened by critical reading of source texts. His 
teachers, for instance, had told students to disobey parents who discouraged them from 
martyrdom, but the Koran demanded parental respect: 
How could people in the Hizb reject their parents so easily? Don’t they know 
about the man who wanted to go on a military expedition and the Prophet said 
that looking after elderly parents was more important than jihad? (p. 155).   
Anonymous (2003) said her critical reading of the Koran left her utterly 
disillusioned. “I had read the whole thing and could no longer fool myself, saying that 
these inhumane verses were taken out of context” (p. 148).  Further: 
The whole Quran is full of verses that teach the killing of the unbelievers and tell 
how Allah will route them after they die. There are very few lessons on morality, 
of justice, honesty or on love. The only message the entire book conveys is to 
believe in Allah and to achieve this, it coaxes people with celestial rewards of 
unlimited sex with fair houris in Paradise and coerces them with the threat of 
blazing fires of hell. (p. 148) 
Anonymous (2003) reflected:  
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When the Koran speaks of righteousness, it does not really mean righteousness as 
we intend it, but it means belief in Allah. Good actions are irrelevant; belief in 
Allah is the ultimate purpose of a person’s life and of the entire creation. (p. 148) 
Hirsi (2007) opened the Koran to assuage her doubts: 
If God were merciful, then why did Muslim have to shun non-Muslims - even to 
attack them, to establish a state based on Allah’s laws? If He is just, then why 
were women so downtrodden? I began collecting together all the verses in the 
Quran that said God was wise, God was omnipotent, God was just… I pondered 
them.” (Infidel, 2007, p. 33) 
One sees the As-Is clearly with Hirsi (2007) when she concluded: 
Clearly in real life, Muslim women were not ‘different but equal’ as her teacher, 
Sister Aziza had maintained. The Quran said ‘men rule over women’. In the eyes 
of the law and in every detail of daily life, we were clearly worth less than men. 
(p. 102) 
Hirsi’s teachers warned her she was Satan's instrument. So,  
I bought my own English edition of the Quran and read it so I could understand it 
better. But I found that everything Boqol Sawm [a particularly fanatical preacher] 
had said was in there. Women should obey their husbands. Women were worth 
half a man. Infidels should be killed. (2007, p.104)  




Held-Evans (2010) desperately wanted to believe, so she collected evidence “for 
the little trial I was conducting in my head” (p. 97). This included looking into evolution, 
reading about comparative regions, and confronting an unflattering history of her church. 
“I studied troubling biblical texts that seemed to support slavery, misogyny, violence and 
ethnic cleansing” (p. 97). As-Is doubts accumulated: If God is good and merciful then 
why did he command Joshua to kill every man, woman and child? That seems to be 
genocide. How could God be fair and just if most people face eternal damnation? It 
seemed a little suspicious that the only true religion was the one she happened to grow up 
in.   
She tried to read the Testament as though she were seeing it for the first time: “If 
someone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. Love your enemies and pray 
for those who persecute you. Do not store up for yourself treasure on earth. Do not judge” 
(p. 98).  She realized these Biblical teachings contradicted Church practices. Her church, 
for instance, applauded decadent, godless and immoral celebrities, politicians, and 
billionaires, as well as rationalized behavior that the Bible called “evil”. Far from 
forgiving, the Church was intent on retribution, on setting boundaries and on despising 
people like the homeless and needy. Held-Evans (2010) concluded, “The teachings of 
Jesus fly in the face of all we are told by our culture and even by the church” (p. 104).  In 
fact, “as I grew more acquainted with the Gospels [I realized] that Jesus had a very 
different view of faith than the one to which I was accustomed” (p. 104).  Far from being 
the elect, or the Lamb of Jesus, absorption in the text showed Held-Evans (2010) that 
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God helped all sorts of people from pagans to despots, regardless of their creed. This As-
Is accumulation of contradictions made Held-Evans admit “I was [a] skeptic” (p. 97).  
Cross (2006) studied world history to reinforce her faith, and found material that 
made her question her Christian fundamentalist lifestyle.  Intensive historical research 
showed her there were hundreds of books purporting to be the exclusive testimonies of 
Jesus and that it was only because of the subjective wrangling of a certain Council of 
Nicaea that an arbitrary 66 books were chosen for “Holy Scripture”. Fundamentalist 
apologetics rang hollow:  
I remember the day, sitting at the kitchen table while the girls wrote their lessons, 
when I closed my history book and stared out in the blank openness of the 
universe. If, instead of God’s direct revelation from heaven, the Bible was simply 
a compilation of religious writings that supported an emerging third-century 
religious sect, fundamentalist Christianity was a house of cards. Its cornerstone 
belief that the Bible was without error and thus could be used as a textbook for 
modern ethics was patently absurd. (p. 133) 
This made Cross (2006) investigate the roots of Christianity “letting historical 
evidence, rather than religious fervor, lead the way” (p. 134). She delved into church 
history and anthropology, philosophy, comparative religions, and sociology and, 
gradually, found facts defeating faith. One sees a replication of the same As-Is theme, 
where focus on the literalness of key texts, or primary sources, results in an immediate 
encounter (somewhat like the Buberian I-Thou experience) that defeats years of 
indoctrinated teachings, like hostility to outsiders. 
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Sub-Theme Two: Clashes of Information  
Broad reading, or exposure to other ideas, was another path that seemed to cause 
subjects to reverse their prejudices. Deen’s (2015) rebellion developed with the internet, 
radio and the local library. Cross’ (2006) questions developed with classes that included 
comparative history, philosophy, and literature. She delved into church history and 
anthropology, philosophy, comparative religions, and sociology, and was disturbed to 
discover Church diagrams refuted by the historical record. “History showed that the New 
Testament was not an errorless document that had been dedicated by God to the apostles 
shortly after the death of Jesus” (p. 131).  
Husain (2007) changed his mind on kafir (i.e., infidels) through the following: “I 
started to read as widely as possible about representative government, freedom and 
democracy and realize that these were all contested concepts... reflecting different social 
and political realities in different countries” (p. 159). Islamic radicalism, he noted, was 
rooted in rejection of the West. Its hatred was a legacy of the group, not of the Koran, and 
it was the group, not the Koran, that institutionalized intolerance. 
One of Husain’s professors showed how history and the present was generated by 
a past open to multiple interpretations. Husain (2007) learned that historical records do 
not necessarily tell us what happened, but only what their authors wanted us to know 
about what happened or the author's perceptions on the event. The Hizb prided 
themselves on “their intellectual purity” as “carriers of deep enlightened thought” (p. 
160), but Husain (2007) wondered whether their intentions were really as pure as they 
claimed, or whether these intentions were constructions of their periods.  He had to sever 
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himself from his faith-infused environment (“Away from the halaqah, in a free 
intellectual atmosphere” [p. 160]) to conclude that heretics were only called kafir because 
they opposed accepted custom. To be called a heretic, he concluded, was subjective, 
making hating outsiders irrational. 
Hirsi (2007) gained her solace from Western books. “The more I learned about 
government, about the development of the individual, about systems of thought on social 
democracy and liberalism ... the more I preferred things this way” (Infidel, 2007, p. 248). 
When she contrasted the West to her cultural experiences, she concluded that “the 
concept of individual choice improved people's lives so visibly... I was enamored of the 
idea that you should think precisely and question everything and build your own 
theories” (p. 248). Her As-Is experiences and study generated cognitive dissonance. 
Held-Evans’ (2010) “most liberating moment “came,  she writes, when she delved 
into world religions, history, sociology and anthropology and “discovered, as if for the 
first time, the diversity of my own religious tradition” (p. 131).  Christianity alone had 
thousands of different creeds. Mormonism, in turn, was split into dozens more. Who was 
to say her Church owned the Truth.  
To summarize, critical exposure to other ideas seems to have been another factor 
causing subjects to question their socialized prejudices. The same As-Is theme occurs 
where subjects seemed compelled by their absorption in primary sources to question their 
convictions. 
Sub-Theme Three: A surprise encounter that showed the goodness and altruism of 
the demonized other.  
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This theme refers to unexpected encounters with the demonized other, or 
“outsider”, where the other proved kinder, better, and more compassionate than 
stereotyped by the group. It is another instance of As-Is, since the reality contradicts 
group teachings. 
Harris (2011) described how moved he was seeing an “apostate” minister humbly 
use his own resources to feed homeless adults who lived under bridges.  He concluded 
that this was real Christian love not the kind practiced by his particular group, who 
strapped placards to shoulders and blasted homosexuals.  This unanticipated face-to-face 
encounter with pure goodness, shattered indoctrination and shook his fidelity to his 
Church. Love doesn't happen, he writes, by being isolated from the world and by only 
donating to one’s community. Rather, it happens by interacting with the world and by 
contributing to the whole universe.  Real love must be seen to be believed. This kindness 
was a more incarnational love than that practiced by his group. Says he “I knew it when I 
saw it.” (p. 20). Note the emphasis on seeing and realness. 
Husain (2007) had been attracted to Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb ut-Tahrir because 
they claimed to represent true Islam and to perfect the world, but after one vicious group 
meeting he wondered. “Where was all the brotherhood we spoke about? On the bus home 
that day, for the first time in years, I cried” (p. 110). Over time, he wondered whether 
Islam had anything to offer and soon realized he was confounding Islamism with Islam.  
 The disillusionment of Nawaz (2013) started in Pakistan, with the As-Is 
disconnect with leaders’ preaches and their brutality.  Nawaz (2013), jailed for killing 
non-Muslims, was confounded when Amnesty International freed him because it was the 
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“right” thing to do.  He remarked, “As I got sucked into the Islamist ideology, I began to 
dehumanize others [while Amnesty] instead of dehumanizing people, it dehumanized 
them” (p. 184). This As-Is perspective made him question his willingness to kill infidels: 
“Instead of being fascinated with the afterlife and death, for the first time in many years I 
began to reconnect with life itself, and with humanity” (p. 185). 
Nawaz (2013), also, scrutinized Islamic history and found a “rather different 
story” than what the Hizb-a-Tihr (HT) had told him. He noted, for example, that not only 
had the Caliphate lacked the unitary codified legal system that HT advocated as a “return 
to the old”, but that it was a far more flexible, tolerant, and pluralistic and more 
compassionate system than his own. When he came into contact with outsiders in jail, he 
contrasted the violent and farcical behavior of his teachers with the gentle and humane 
conduct of the demonized other. “I had always been taught - and had passionately 
believed - that the presence of Islamism meant justice, and the absence of it created 
injustice. But now I began to see things differently” (p. 92). 
To summarize, this “altruism” theme, where kindness done by the demonized 
other contradicts prejudiced teachings also contains an As-Is theme, where subjects 
collide with a phenomenological essence that breach their convictions. 
Connection to the Research Questions  
The sample population. Each of the subjects grew up in closed faith settings, 
where group leaders emphasized their elites, while derogating outsiders. Members of 
these groups were taught to fear the unknown and to distrust any system of knowledge 
that differed from theirs. As Hammersborg (2005) writes, members knew that breaking-
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out would mean rejection from family and friends. Shoshi (n.d.), for example, was 
brought up in a community so small that “once you are OTD you can’t really walk 
around the frum [i.e. “pious”] area without meeting people you know, and some people 
will make your visits uncomfortable by publicly telling you off, screaming at you or at 
best ignore you” (para.2; online). There were no organizations to help defectors, while 
members who rebelled were told they had a mental illness. Shoshi grew up with ten 
siblings. She writes that they: 
Were extremely frum [i.e. “pious”]. We spoke only Yiddish, the girls always had 
to wear tights outside of the bedroom, and always had to dress modestly. 
Newspapers or fiction books were not allowed to enter the house, even the frum 
yiddish newspapers were considered schmutz [dirty] ... My mother vocally 
opposed anything secular, and would consistently contact the school and teachers 
about anything that she considered excessive promotion of English language and 
ideas such as a sketch based on the book Heidi or a song with English lyrics. 
(Online; para. 6)  
Husain (2007) was taught he was a better, purer, and superior Muslim to others 
and that others who were kafir, namely non-religious or only “partial Muslim”, deserved 
his scorn and hostility.  
Hostility could become vicious. Nasr’s (2013) teachers, for instance, asked each 
child what they wanted to be when they grew up, then warned them that Jews would 
destroy their dreams. The students were trained to stand up and chorus “The Jews are our 
enemies. They kill innocent people every day… They drink [your] blood” (p.35). 
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Ruth Garrett (2003) described how: 
As Old Order Amish children, we were taught that we were the privileged ones, 
chosen by God to do his work and the only ones who stood a chance of being 
saved.  We were also warned that everything outside our world, otherwise known 
as English, was evil, inhabited by thieves and liars. (p 8)  
The Jehovah Witness sect of Abrahams (2010) taught her that “worldly” people corrupted 
her. She was forbidden to play with “worldly” friends and was taught to pray “go away 
Satan” to diminish their influence: 
If I had to quote one scripture that was drilled into our brains from children, it 
would be 1 Corinthians 15.33, which reads ‘do not be misled; bad associations 
spoil useful habits.’ It didn't matter what kind of person you were.  People who 
were Jehovah Witnesses were considered good associations, and that was where 
the creditor for fishing ended. Sure, some people might appear to be nice on the 
outside. They may even claim to be Christian. But Satan, they were told, used 
them as opportunity to lead Jehovah Witnesses astray. Sin, they were over and 
again taught, lurks in their hearts... The point was, if someone wasn't a JW, he 
was going to die at Armageddon, and there was no point in befriending the 
condemned. (p. 470) 
Anonymous (2016) described how she was taught to distance herself from 
Gentiles: 
 I was warned away from cultivating any close friendships with non-Jehovah’s 
Witnesses”. The process of leaving was so intimidating that “most young 
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Witnesses grow up sequestered in their homes and their congregations, fearful of 
anything outside those boundaries. If at any point you do have doubts and want to 
leave, your forced isolation up to that point makes the decision inevitably 
intimidating and potentially overwhelming because of the prospect of being alone 
and without a support network to guide you through the process (online; para. 6).  
When she left the faith at age 18, her best friends shunned her and attributed her 
apostasy to material weakness and greed. 
Tate (2005) was taught that America was “the most vile and wicked nation on 
Earth, one that would be destroyed” (p. 30). Indoctrination started from kindergarten on: 
Every day we were drilled on a few of our twenty-five Actual Facts… we were 
taught that our God, who came to North America in the form of Master W. Fard 
Muhammad, measured the Earth, all the other planets and the distance between. 
This God wanted us to memorize the widths and weights of all the planets, our 
teachers said, because someday we black people, especially when few of us 
chosen for the Nation of Islam, would rule the world… By age six I could rattle 
off facts and figures in cadence. (p. 30) 
Each of these authors was taught to condemn outsiders. Many of them were 
taught to hate. Some were brought up to harm and kill others and were applauded by their 
communities for doing so. 
Hirsi’s lecturers indoctrinated their students to hate the West and Jews: 
Sister Aziza told us about the Jews. She described them in such a way that I 
imagined them as physically monstrous: they had horns on their heads, and noses 
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so large they stuck right out of their faces like great beaks. Devils and djinns 
literally flew out of their heads to mislead Muslims and spread evil. Everything 
that went wrong was the fault of the Jews... Saddam Hussein was a Jew. The 
Americans were controlled by Jews. The Jews controlled the world and that was 
why we had to be pure: to resist this evil influence. (Infidel, 2007, p. 85) 
Nuqul Sawm, a popular preacher, was one of the many young men belonging to 
the Muslim Brotherhood, who strode through the streets and screamed “at the top of their 
lungs” (Hirsi, 2007, p. 85) for citizens to hate infidels. Hirsi (2007) described how such 
preachers gained thousands of converts as well as donations, with some women donating 
their dowries. This irrational, extreme hatred penetrated all aspects of life. This is not the 
type of prejudice studied on liberal American campuses where researchers do IAT tests 
on black-and-white racism. It is a racism manifested by a conflict-ridden society, 
socialized by years of indoctrination. 
Other subjects like Deen (2015) and Klein-Halevi (2014) may not have joined 
Jihads, but their environments applauded and sanctified violence to apostates and 
outsiders. Klein-Halevi (2014) grew up among Holocaust survivors from Eastern Europe 
who passed on their traumas: 
In the yeshiva I attended we got a children's magazine called Olomeinu, Our 
World - an appropriate name, because nothing non-Jewish, extra systemic 
penetrated its pages… Some Borough Park children said it was a mitzvah, a 
religious commandment, to spit when you passed a church. An alternative opinion 
held that it was forbidden to even walk within spitting distance of a church. There 
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was a big church… near Eighteenth Avenue, and I’d cross the street rather than 
pass it. If I got too close, grasping hands might suddenly emerge from its massive 
doors and drag me into the basement, where priests would imprison me and force 
me to become a Christian. (p. 15) 
In time, Klein-Halevi determined that he “wanted to be a protector and an avenger like 
Yossi Katz, a “big boy” who single-handedly prevented a pogrom in a Hungarian village. 
Had Tate (2005), who lived in Brooklyn, too, met Katz, she would have hated him - 
because he was Jewish and White and she Muslim and Black.  Tate’s uncles boasted how 
they attacked Whites for fun. “I guess we was about, eleven or twelve, ok,” one uncle 
tells her, “and we had this little club called the White Hunters Club… what we used to 
do, okay, was, we would go around,” he paused for drama, “and beat up white people” (p. 
25).  They would hide in bushes near Union Station, “all of us in a group”, see a White 
lady (it usually was the women who were more vulnerable), kick her in the legs, and run. 
Their uncles were respected in the Temple, where preachers demonized Whites. 
The Research Questions 
1. What are the lived experiences of defectors of closed faith groups as they 
disengage and deradicalize?  
Initially, each of the subjects sought to retain their convictions. Their identities 
were tied up with their groups, and they knew how much they would lose were they to 
challenge or defy group ideas. All of my subjects lost friends, family members, and their 
sense of identities, along with their status in their groups as they transitioned. Most had to 
72 
 
deal with a strange world, which was foreign to them and where they knew no one. They 
had no support, nor the education and know-how to deal with this outside world. 
Agonizing religious doubt was another common aspect. Most of my subjects 
pushed back on their questions and many started their investigations to quell their 
doubts... For most, their defection was a spotty, circuitous, grueling journey. Tate (2005), 
for instance, tried to tell herself that Satan was testing her and her religious doubts were 
for self-improvement. At one point, she became suicidal: 
Some nights I curled up on the window sill and wondered if I jumped where I 
would die before my body hit the ground below. That way I could die without 
feeling the pain. I was tired of living, tired of thinking, tired of feeling. Tired of 
feeling the anger, confusion and depression… I wanted to do the right thing and 
please Allah, mostly to avoid His wrath. But I wasn't clear about that the right 
thing was anymore. For the next couple of months I was so depressed I couldn't 
eat, and my clothes began to sag.” (pp. 224-225)  
On Ramadan, Tate read each of the 114 chapters of the Quran and prayed over her 
doubts. Husain (2007) compared his identity to a narrative that was logical and clear one 
moment and chaotic and confused the next. His narrative consisted of statements such as 
“Our religious tradition and holy book is the truth. Theirs is rotten and corrupt.” (p.110) 
and “My God is awesome. Theirs isn’t.”  And then came the rupture, where “you 
discover things you’d rather not deal with… and it can be painful” (p. 111). Nawaz 
(2013) described his experiences as “uncomfortable” and guilt-ridden. “I shied away 
from the implications [of my thoughts] for a long time, retreating back into the comfort of 
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my Islamic beliefs” (p. 192). Like the other biographers, “as hard as I tried to bury [my 
doubts], I couldn't shift the nagging thoughts I had in my mind” (p. 192). Hs wife 
divorced him and took the children. 
Hirsi’s parents refused to speak to her, her husband left her, and her sister, who 
tried to leave too, killed herself, since the loneliness was too intense. Hirsi has 
government-paid protection to save her from those who consider her an infidel. Growing 
up, she was warned her doubts led to hell, “But I found I couldn't ignore them. I had to 
resolve this” (2005, p. 105). Similarly, Held-Evans (2010) persistently: 
look[ed] for ways to glue the pieces of my faith back together, trying to convince 
myself and my friends that everything was okay. In my commencement address, I 
assured the senior class that we were exceptionally prepared to answer life’s 
questions, that our biblical worldview glasses would bring everything into focus, 
sharpening the contrast between black and white, right and wrong, evil and good. 
I said it, wanting desperately to believe it was true. I said it, knowing good and 
well that it wasn't going to be that simple. I said it, knowing that the world just 
didn’t make that kind of sense anymore.” (p. 80) 
Changing long-held convictions can be frightening. Anonymous (2003) reflected 
“After reading the Koran, my perspective of reality was jolted. I found myself standing 
face-to-face with the truth and I was scared to look at it” (p. 148). Here, by the way, is 
another As-Is term. Anonymous (2003) was jolted from the comfort of faith (that told her 
she was unique and elite) to incarnational reality: “This wasn't what I was expecting to 
see. I had no one to blame, to curse and call a liar. I had found all those absurdities of the 
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Koran and the inhumanities of the author by reading the Koran itself.” (p. 148). Nawaz 
(2013) titled the chapter of his change “where the heart leads, the mind can follow”, but 
he said it took a long time for his mind to change: 
My change of views wasn’t an overnight process. Ideological dogma doesn't work 
like that: It’s not like a tap you can just switch off. So ingrained was HT’s cause 
in my very being that it would be a process of years for me to work my way out of 
it. First emotionally and then intellectually, and politically, and finally socially, 
until piece by piece I had to reconstruct my personality from the inside out. This 
is not an easy thing to do” (p. 181). 
His exploration took five agonizing years. “This was the prism, the mind-set from within 
which I had viewed the world: to unpick that, in descending order, until I questioned all 
my fundamental convictions was nothing less than a paradigm shift” (p. 182). 
Once started, the search could not be stopped. This was why Deen (2015) called 
his book All Who Go Do Not Return. According to Nasr (2013): 
“By September 2006, I was beginning to feel scared from all the blog 
reading and blogging, but I couldn't stop. It was too late. My subversive thoughts 
and activities had already opened a can of worms that had to be dealt with” (p. 
112). 
2. What are the pathways for changing prejudice among defectors of closed faith 
groups?  
I extracted one overarching theme of As-Is with three sub-themes of concentrated 
multidisciplinary readings of primary texts, critical analysis of religious texts, and 
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unexpected altruism by the demonized person. It seemed to me that each of these themes 
could be reduced to the As-Is, where face-to-face encounter with an incarnational reality 
dispelled indoctrinated intolerance to outsiders. 
I noticed that many of the subjects used indicative expressions. Garett (2003), for 
instance, said “My mind was a tornado. [After] that moment I felt as though I had been 
flying blind for years” (p. 20).  Cross (2006) described her studies as a light that broke 
through “the fog” (p. 131). Hirsi (2005) said the religious and cultural contradictions 
confused her “she couldn't see straight” (p. 32). Later, she added “the “little shutter” in 
the back of her brain opened and thoughts came tumbling out (p. 104). Held-Evan (2010) 
only knew that “sometime in my late teens or early twenties, it was as if Jesus packed his 
bags and moved from my heart into my head” (p. 105). Note the transition from affect to 
cognition, where the comfort and emotion of faith gives way to the distance and logic of 
cognition. 
Research Team  
I recruited an assistant to duplicate my research methods and to generate her own 
inferences, some of which differed from mine. For example, my assistant noted that one 
of the things that made Hill (2013) challenge Scientology was realizing its prescriptions 
were based on Society rather than on Religion and that Scientology subordinated 
Religion to its own inclinations. Similarly, my assistant thought that one of the things that 
made Harris (2011) change was distinguishing between Church and Religion and 
noticing that his Church was not necessarily religious in that it transgressed Biblical 
prescriptions. Tate (2005), too, contrasted teachings of self-improvement of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood with the outside world and concluded her community failed her. When it 
came to accounts written by ex-Muslims involved in terrorism or attempted terrorism, my 
assistant wrote that “most of these people saw what their religion was doing to other 
people and themselves and how what they were taught wasn't true. This made them bitter 
and go in different ways... and get angry.”  
Deen (2015) contrasted the conduct of people in the outside world where his job 
was with that described by his group. Few of these individuals seemed as lecherous, 
miserable, and aimless, as his community told him they were. Men and women held 
hands when walking the streets. They seemed to live happier and more harmonious lives 
than he had been told. Few hated him, as he had been warned. My colleague pointed out 
that Watts (2014) also deradicalized himself through repeat encounters with facts. Watts 
(2014) wrote that he liked facts. His frustrations with the inaccuracies of his Church 
reinforced by extensive reading and a critical review of Holy Writ led him to question his 
prejudices.  
My assistant came up with five themes: Wide reading, always asking questions, 
exposure to the goodness of outsiders, encountering incidents that disproved doctrine. 
Her fifth theme was emotional experiences.  As mentioned, I rejected that theme for the 
reasons described earlier. My assistant pointed to Black (2006) as manifesting each of 
these four themes. He conducted wide reading of both core and multidisciplinary texts, 
experienced an encounter with as-Is, and described the unexpected loving-kindness of 
members of the demonized group. Black (2006), for instance, studied medieval history 
and noted that far from Whites being as evolutionarily superior and cultured as he had 
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been taught, they had gone through periods of profound decay during which Muslims and 
Asians superseded their intellectual and technological contributions. Black’s discussions 
with Jewish hosts on Shabbat made him question his prejudice to the point that he 
publicly recanted his opinions. They behaved in ways that contradicted his ideas of them. 
Their kindness also bewildered him. 
Summary 
  This chapter described how 21 subjects who grew up in hate-filled closed faith 
groups renounced their extreme prejudices, despite being penalized by their groups as a 
result.  I used IPA and social constructivism to explore for themes and to control my bias 
and recruited an objective student to model my research. My study yielded four themes: 
As-Is (a phenomenological contact with an unexpected reality that shattered conviction), 
intensive reading of the subject’s own religious texts, focused multidisciplinary reading, 
and altruistic conduct exhibited by a member of the demonized group. It seemed to me 
each of these four themes could be reduced to the As-Is element. Finally, I connected 
these themes to my research questions. The As-Is experience seems to have impelled my 
subjects to retract their prejudices, while each of my subjects showed common 
experiences of isolation from an outside society, living in a violence-saturated society, 
and experiencing a progressive unravelling where subjects labored to suppress their 
doubts, and were shunned as a result. Chapter Five discusses the limitations and 
implications of this study. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
This IPA study investigated 21 individuals brought up in closed faith groups who 
challenged their extreme prejudice. Certain closed faith groups preach extreme prejudice 
resulting in violence, aggression and, sometimes, terrorism. Deradicalization programs 
for radicalized individuals exist that employ preventative measures by targeting profiles 
of people who are deemed most at risk to violent extremism or developing encounter-
type groups to encourage tolerance. Some of these programs are effective, but it is 
difficult to verify the case-by-case impact and to correctly identify individuals most at-
risk, partly because people hide their prejudices (OPM, 2008). The main problem with 
such programs is that they attract only individuals who are already interested in meeting 
different others, in contrast to members of closed faith groups who fear outsiders would 
contaminate them and that they would be penalized by their groups for interacting. 
Those, therefore, who most need such programs absent themselves from them.  
I wondered how some individuals who grow up in closed faith settings 
independently reverse their beliefs and whether there was some insight into their 
prejudice reversals that entities like social work practitioners and peace activists could 
use. I found their attitude reversal particular confounding given that such individuals 
contradict social norms on seeking acceptance and rebel despite being severely penalized 
as a result. I also wondered how these individuals were able to detach themselves from 
their indoctrinations and change their prejudice attitudes, despite being closed off from 
the world.  
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Social science researchers largely conduct prejudice interventions on campus 
settings in conflict-free environments, rendering results irrelevant to real-life prejudice 
(Paluck & Green, 2009). Paluck and Green (2009) also reported that most prejudice 
intervention methodologies show minimal to no evidence of efficacy. Finally, prejudice 
research tends to investigate moderate to weak prejudice, altogether abandoning bigotry 
and extreme intolerance. This study aimed to compensate for those gaps by investigating 
autobiographical accounts of radical hostility in real-life settings. I used a flexible IPA to 
investigate the lived experiences of 21 former members of closed societies as they 
reversed their prejudice attitudes, and to probe for common themes describing the attitude 
changes of these individuals.  To obtain research objectivity, I recruited an assistant who 
replicated my methodology and produced her own results.  
I based my research on the following two questions:  
RQ1: What are the lived experiences of defectors of closed faith groups as they disengage 
and deradicalize?  
RQ2: What are the pathways for changing prejudice among defectors of closed faith 
groups?  
This chapter summarizes the study’s findings, before discussing its limitations 
and implications for future research. 
Connection to the Literature 
Paluck and Green’s (200) comprehensive review on prejudice methods concluded 
with three recommendations. First, researchers should focus on prejudice in real-life 
settings, rather than in the conflict-free environments of academic institutions. Second, 
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prejudice studies should integrate qualitative with quantitative research for more reliable 
results. Third, more prejudice studies should investigate extreme prejudice, particularly 
with bigotry and terrorism on the rise (Paluck, 2012).  My study investigated extreme 
prejudice in a real-life conflictual setting. 
I conducted a flexible IPA to investigate the lived experience of former members 
of closed societies as they reversed their indoctrinated bias. An assistant replicated my 
study, and we used social constructivism to bracket our bias. My IPA research led to four 
themes that seemed to describe the phenomenon under investigation. The first theme I 
called “As-Is”, where subjects seemed to experience an unanticipated collision of beliefs 
with incarnate reality. The second theme illustrated how subjects reversed their 
prejudices through critical reading of their source texts. The third theme dwelt on critical 
analysis of multidisciplinary primary texts, while the fourth and last theme showed how 
certain subjects renounced their attitudes after receiving, or witnessing, altruism from the 
demonized other. It seemed to me that each of the four themes could be reduced to one 
“As-Is” essence, where subjects found their beliefs jolted by an unanticipated 
phenomenological encounter.  
Contrary to more temperate or moderate groups that are less concerned about 
members leaving (possibly because they feel more confident with themselves (Sacks, 
2017)), closed faith groups are more possessive with their members. They intimidate 
them from leaving with threats and abuse and encourage them to stay with promised 
rewards (like Paradise) and social incentives like acceptance. Douglas (1966) notes all 
societies like to impose order, but that some do so more than others. These groups’ 
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empathies rituals as meaning-making for identity and societal values and distinguish 
between an “us” and a “them” to make its members feel superior (also see Derrida, 
1986). 
Groups that have more rigid, or doctrinaire, forms of thinking tend to be more 
concerned about “infections” invading their orderly world and about the ability of their 
immune system to cope with these infections. They, therefore, feel threatened by both 
outside and inside influences - by outside influences that are contrary to their own ideas 
and by people or ideas that demand parity and move in their own spaces. The last are 
ambivalent people within the group, who have been branded as deserters, troublemakers, 
or detractors of value (Douglas, 1966). Such people arouse anxiety because they ask 
questions that the group is unable to answer or because they are not “like us” (Bauman & 
May, 2003).  
Most closed groups use a combination of territorial and spiritual separation, such 
as insulating themselves into ghettos and making the conditions both “inside” and 
“outside” intolerable for detractors if they leave (Douglas, 1966). The more complete the 
territorial separation, the more important does the group became because that’s all what 
members have. Intercourse with strangers is reduced to strictly business exchanges; social 
contacts are avoided (Bauman & May, 2003). Some of the most effective strategies that 
the group uses to dissuade intimate connection with these “outsiders” is through overt 
hostility, resentment, and prejudice. Active avoidance of contact is constantly boosted by 
the fear of contamination from those who are not like “us”. Resentment is associated with 
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everything that the stranger represents: their dress, their ways of talking, their rituals, 
their food, their lifestyle in all its nuances.  
Meanwhile, members of such closed faith groups may often be unaware that they 
are controlled, while others crave the order perspective and meaning that their religious 
affiliation gives them (Hansberger & Jackson, 2005). People often think they control their 
destinies, but as Mead (1934) showed, the “self” is acquired over time through factors 
like environment, group, and social interactions with others, rather than an independent 
entity. To people who grow up in a closed faith society, their only, or primary, 
interactions are largely with those in that community. This shapes their identities and 
shapes how they view others. 
Recent neuroscientific studies indicate that individuals may be able to overcome 
their distorted cognitions when their brains are activated by a logical, analytical 
perspective. The psychological term “priming” refers to a stimuli or action that triggers a 
particular representation or cognitive association, such as the word “yellow” of a banana. 
Chiappe, Smith, and Bessner (1996) found that priming may be inhibited when 
participants focus on specific non-evaluative lower-level features of the prime. For 
instance, the researchers found that when they broke down the familiar evaluative word 
of LOVE into the letter string of L-O-V-E, participants replaced their emotional mindset 
with a cognitive one by focusing on those letters. Summarily, Spruyt, De Houwer, and 
Hermans (2009) proposed that priming could be modulated by the stimulus information 
that it is selectively focused on. Glaser (1992) recommend modulating one’s response to 
affective images by intentionally selecting lower-level non-evaluative features (such as 
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focusing on the shapes of the images or on individual letters), which would transform the 
instinctive evaluative reaction into a logical, analytical stance. I noticed instances where 
the prejudice levels of my subjects seemed inhibited when they focused on lower-level 
non-evaluative items. Deen (2015), for instance, described how he first began to see his 
Rebbe as mortal when he fragmented the myth of the Great Man into phenomenological 
particles: 
I began to wonder. Where exactly was the Rebbe’s greatness? Was he a scholar? 
Was he a saint? Had he ever shown anyone any exceptional kindness? How 
would one even know it, considering that he was barely accessible to his 
followers, his acts so meticulously scripted, his public utterances limited to 
carefully prepared thoughts of little consequence, private audiences always brief 
and perfunctory, five minute consultation after a five-hour wait. (p. 15) 
Ayduk, Mischel, and Downey (2002) observed that emotional sensitivity seems to 
be reduced when the individual focuses on the psychologically distancing, physiological 
reactions of the experience, rather than on the emotion itself. People could also distance 
themselves by analyzing their physiological reactions during the emotional incident.  In 
both cases, the individual shifts stimuli from an affective to a non-affective response by 
intentionally focusing on lower-level non-evaluative features. In other words, such agents 
operate from a fact-based/ As-Is mindset.  
Hirsi (2005) described how she saw Kenyan woman molested by Muslim males. 
Others from her culture called the women outcasts. Hirsi reduced the spectacle to lower-
level, cognitive features and saw them as thirsty women who needed help. On the 
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response, she differed between the people and the religion: “Everyone in that camp called 
themselves Muslims and yet nobody helped these women in the name of Allah. Everyone 
was praying - but no one showed compassion” (Infidel, 2007, p. 158).  
Neurological research shows that when a person fixates on emotional aspects, the 
cerebral emotionally-involved regions of the amygdala are flooded with cerebral brain 
fluid (CBF). This CBF decreases when the person fixates on attentionally-demanding, 
cognitive tasks, reducing the viewer’s emotional response (Drevets & Raichle, 1998). 
The left prefrontal cortex, which is the analytical sector, is now activated with its own 
fluid (Drevets & Raichle, 1998) and the person can act rationally. Applying Drevets and 
Raichle (1998) to my study, I noticed the affect-based prejudices of my subjects seemed 
to vanish when their minds focused on cognitive-based facts, regardless of the context. I 
called this the As-Is factor. Held-Evans (2010), for instance, quotes one Mormon 
missionary friend who reflected: “I’ve gotten to know some Muslims pretty well...and 
that’s really changed my perspective. They're not all violent fundamentalists. They don't 
all hate America” (p. 85). This was the logical thinking of the left cortex at play rather 
than the emotion of the amygdala. The missionary particularized Muslims into 
individuals, no longer as a generic demonized entity. 
None of these individuals whom I studied chose to challenge their prejudices. 
None wanted to - just as none of these individuals would have chosen to attend an 
interfaith or deradicalization event. Certain non-evaluative, cognitive-based experiences 
unexpectedly occurred and all found their convictions altered. Husain (2007) was told all 
professors hated Islam, but his university professors “hardly conformed to that 
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stereotype” (p. 158). Anonymous (2003) described himself as “the typical religious 
fundamentalist, trapped in my own world of conspiracies; the Jews are behind 
everything” (p. 15). His prejudices changed when he read the Koran in English: “When I 
read it for the first time, I became very worried by the amount of violence in the texts. 
Subsequent late night sessions with the Koran convinced me that I was reading a text to 
war” (p. 127). 
Finally, Harris (2011) described his attitude change when he saw a minister of a 
vilified church feed homeless individuals from his own resources.  To Harris, this was 
real Christian love in contrast to the kind practiced by his own group who carried 
placards and denounced homosexuals. Says he “I knew it [i.e., love] when I saw it.” (p. 
20). One sees the cognitive component that came with lower-level elements (where the 
practices of his group were reduced to standing with placards and yelling). This defeated 
the literal brain-washing (or swamping) of emotional faith. 
Anonymous (2003) described how her Quranic analysis (where her mind was 
absorbed in non-evaluative elements) brought her “face-to-face with the truth” (p. 148). 
Note that “truth” is a cognitive term.  She reflected that “The denial [of faith] acts as a 
shield that covers [believers], that protects them and that saves them from facing the pain 
of shock and disillusionment” (p. 148).  This is supported by Drevets and Raichle (1998) 
who note that when a person fixates on emotional aspects, the cerebral emotionally-
involved regions are flooded with cerebral brain fluid (CBF), which stops them from 
thinking rationally and seeing the As-Is in its incarnate form. What believers need, 
Anonymous (2003) reflected, “is a good shock” to jolt them from their emotional comfort 
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zone.  Muslims, she says, need to be “bombarded with facts” (p. 149). Drevets and 
Raichle (1998) demonstrate that concentrating on non-evaluative elements reduces the 
CBF fluid in the emotionally-involved regions. What actually happens is that the mind 
converts its emotional triggers into cognitive assessments. 
Hariri, Bookheimer, and Mazziota (2000) used MRI to show that when 
participants focused on emotional expressions of facial images, the CBF of these 
participants increased in the left and right amygdala. On the other hand, when these 
images were accompanied with linguistic labels (which represents a cognitive task), their 
CBF decreased in the amygdala region and increased in the right prefrontal cortex, 
associated with emotion. The researchers concluded that the analytical functions of 
interpretation and labeling can inhibit emotional responses at the most fundamental levels 
in the brain. Evans and Treisman (2005) also note that context has a major influence on 
the responses people make. The more the context emphasizes a cognitive type of 
perception, the more rational is the response and the more it reduces the emotional 
percept of the target.  
In short, extreme prejudice is tantamount to Simon’s (1982) bounded rationality, 
where emotions hinder their possessors from seeing reality as is. Prejudiced individuals 
literally “brainwashed” by their emotional faith convictions, have their right prefrontal 
cortex flooded with cerebral fluid that impedes them from considering anything that 
contradicts their beliefs. It is only when a jarring encounter causes the mind to shift into a 
cognitive mode, that CBF decreases in the amygdala-emotion filled region and allows the 
left region (of logic) to dominate. Indeed, Anonymous (2003) suggested that the one way 
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to challenge Muslim believers is by subtly feeding them data that contradicts their 
convictions. Nothing else, no encounter groups, deradicalization programs, prejudice 
intervention strategies, or the like, have the same effect.  
While there is some literature on the disaffiliation process from religious groups, I 
think there is a radical difference between disaffiliation from “simple” religions and 
disaffiliation from a fundamentalist or extremist religious background with strong 
pressure to conform and isolation from an outside world. Fisher (2017), for instance, 
reviews multidisciplinary research on changes related to exiting religion and the process 
that an individual transitioning toward irreligion may experience. Fisher’s (2017) review 
plots a seven-step process of questioning, doubt, reconfiguration of faith, switching, 
changes to irreligious identities or “deconversion,” disaffiliation, and opposition to 
previously held religious beliefs. According to Fisher (2017), all individuals set out by 
experiencing unconscious questioning that sharpens into doubt. Individuals often choose 
to switch to a different religious group within their wider group or may reconfigure by 
“flying under the radar” (e.g. Berger, 2015, p.679). All this time, they may reject the 
proxy but retain the theology. A certain undocumented percentage of Ultra-Orthodox 
Jews who are too intimidated to outright leave their communities live secret lives as 
agnostic or atheist individuals while publicly appearing Orthodox (e.g., Berger, 2015). 
For some, such behavior results in higher levels of psychological distress as well as in 
more marital tension (Fisher, 2017). Deconversion is the next step, where the member 
leaves the religious group. This may be followed by disaffiliation which takes two forms, 
ending one’s membership or “dropping out” of activity in the religion (Fisher, 2017) and 
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misidentification with the group or theology (Fisher, 2017). In a study of conversion 
narratives of former Muslims, Khalil and Balici (2017) found that most former Muslims 
became Christian, agnostics and atheists. Apparently, more males than women 
deconverted, although Khalil and Balici’s (2017) study is based only on a limited sample 
of popular published narratives, popular online testimonials and interviews with former 
Muslims.  
As Fisher (2017) notes, the process and after-effects of deconversion vary from 
person to person. Some exit the group quickly (sometimes within a few weeks), while 
others take years of uncertainty and anguish to make the break. Defectors leave for a 
variety of reasons, ranging from intellectual concerns to psychological motives. Their 
reason for leaving tend to depend on their own personal experiences and on the practices 
and aspects of their groups (Fisher, 2016). Shaffir and Rockaway (1987), for instance, 
found that ultra-orthodox Jews who disaffiliated were motivated by extended periods of 
doubt, or having questions ignored or poorly dealt with by others.  Khalil and Balici 
(2007) report that former Muslims cite the status of women as a major motivating factor 
for their exits. Hookway and Habibis (2015) conclude that individuals from Jehovah 
Witness seem to leave largely because of their dissatisfaction with JW practices together 
with the allure of freedom and the hedonistic attractions of this-worldly lifestyles. 
Similarly, the after-effects vary according to the rigidity of their groups. Goren and Plaut 
(2012) concluded that not only do some deconverts not experience emotional pain as a 
part of the process, but they also benefit from non-belief in some ways, such us such as 
higher prosociality toward outgroup members. It seems to me that Goren and Plaut’s 
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(2012) studies come from more moderate religious groups, where leaving is not treated so 
weightily or harshly as it is in more extremist versions. 
 Defectors from most extreme groups suffer more intensely and longer than 
defectors from more moderate groups, where most still keep in touch with their friends, 
have not experienced the type or intensity of indoctrination that those from extremist 
groups experience, are better able to transition to an “outside” world and are, generally, 
not punished for doing so. In most cases, defectors tend to feel guilt, anxiety, the 
confusion and pain of switching from a life-narrative that made sense and that ordered 
their identities and gave them a mission to a world that was suddenly purposeless. 
Hookway and Habibis (2015), for instance, found that individuals who defected from JW 
experienced high levels of anxiety, guilt, and insecurity. (“The gamble on freedom had 
immediate rewards but they continued to fear its ultimately catastrophic consequences – 
‘getting wiped out’ at Armageddon” (Hookway & Habibis, 2015, p. 854). This is 
particularly the case with those individuals across groups who transitioned to agnosticism 
or atheism. Indeed, Moscati and Mezuk (2014) found that such transition in perceptors 
tended to demote self-esteem and, occasionally, resulted in substance abuse. Scheitle and 
Adamczyk (2010) associate defection from “strict” religion with worse health. In 
Berger’s (2015) treatise on former ultra-orthodox Jews, he reports that finding show the 
same “taxing personal process [of culture shock, loneliness, and financial difficulties” (p. 
680) as reported in studies of those defecting from the Mormon Church (Albrecht and 
Bahr, 1983), cults (Solomon, 1991), the Amish (Garrett and Farrant, 2003) or Islam 
(Khalil and Bilici, 2007). Berger (2015) describes that: 
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Like immigrants thrown into a strange land where they do not know the rules, the 
language, what is expected and what is prohibited, without a script to guide them 
or anybody to support them, exiters felt like aliens and tried to grope their way to 
the best of their ability. These challenges yielded feelings of anxiety, frustration, 
loneliness, sadness, anger, and distress as manifested in statements such as ‘‘it 
drove me crazy’’ and ‘‘I was dying inside.’’ (pp. 680-681) 
 Many individuals feel stuck between two worlds, unable to feel accepted or comfortable 
in mainstream society (e.g., Fisher, 2017). 
Fisher’s (2017) final step of the exit process is apostasy where a certain segment 
of defectors not only disaffiliate but also indicate an oppositional stance where they 
“engage in a continuous chain of acts of revenge against [her or his] own spiritual past” 
(Scheler, 1992, p. 131). Fisher (2017) cited Smith (2011) who found that those who came 
from stricter religious backgrounds tended to more resentment toward religion and were 
more public about these feelings than others. In a study of former evangelical Christians, 
Fazzino (2014) noted that publicizing the negative aspects of their religion helped these 
individuals make more sense of their disaffiliation. Most famous former Muslims in this 
category include writers and activists like Muslim-turned-Christian Nonie Darwish, 
Jeffrey Lang (Losing My Religion: A Call for Help), and Muslim-turned-agnostic Ibn 
Warraq (Why I am not a Muslim and Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out). Some of these 
works were quoted in this essay. 
In my brief review on the disaffiliation process from religious groups, I noticed 
that several authors (e.g., Albrecht and Bahr (1990) on those exiting the Mormon Church 
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and Greil and Davidman (2007) on the defection of Orthodox Jews) noted that the more 
religious the upbringing, the less likely was the person to leave. This was not the case 
with me - I came from an intensely religious background - nor was it the case with my 21 
subjects. Some researchers also suggest that disaffiliation from strict groups is prompted 
by dysfunction in filial attachment and cross-generational religious adherence (e.g., 
Hookway & Habibis, 2015). Greil and Davidman (2007), for instance, found that 
movement out of the Haredim was often prompted by the presence of a less committed 
parent. Again, I found exceptions with my subjects. Most of my case studies (although 
not myself) had close contact with their parents, if not grandparents. There was no inter-
generational break. 
 In the end, I can only conclude that people leave their religious groups for a 
variety of reasons that vary according to their particular experiences, characters, and 
qualities of their groups, strictness of their groups, economic, political, and geo-historical 
aspects, among other factors. Reasons are so diverse that it may impossible to generalize.  
Interpretations of the Findings 
I chose to study extreme prejudice because of the lack of research on this 
important topic (Paluck & Green, 2009). Since Paluck and Green (2009) recommend that 
prejudice researchers focus on real life situations in conflict-filled settings, I studied 
individuals who grew up in closed faith societies and who independently retracted their 
prejudices. I chose this population after realizing that prejudice-reduction programs, like 
deradicalization programs or programs based on Allport’s (1954) ‘contact hypothesis’ 
idea, have small to minimal impact on extreme prejudice. (Allport’s contact hypothesis 
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recommends acquaintanceship with members of the stigmatized group and has evolved 
into egalitarian, interfaith groups, and the like. According to Paluck and Green (2009), 
the contact hypothesis works best under limited and largely superficial/ laboratory 
conditions).  
On the one hand, governments focus on reactive measures such as 
deradicalization groups in response to individuals who are already radicalized. On the 
other hand, social scientists develop preventative measures, seeking to remediate the 
psychological, emotional and intellectual appeal of social narratives that violence-based 
groups use to recruit their members. Examples of the latter include programs that teach 
perspective-taking (Dovidio et al., 2004; Galinsky & Moscowitz, 2000), awareness of 
moral hypocrisy (Oskamp, 1992; Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002), and training in complex 
thinking and in statistical logic (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Such programs are usually 
executed in school or college classrooms and may challenge a group’s ideology by 
pointing out contradictions in its theology (e.g., Christmann, 2012), involving members 
in positive affiliative-building activities, or giving them responsibilities to provide the 
feeling of belonging and sense of purpose that people attracted to terrorist groups cherish 
(Christmann, 2012; Davies, 2016). 
The Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS) (2015) pointed out 
differences in extreme prejudice across three types of groups - terrorist organizations, 
gangs, and cults - and recommended that deradicalization programs would improve their 
efficacy if they focused on the disjuncture between these different groups.  Terrorist 
affiliation is usually produced by a sense of political grievance or individual 
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victimization, fear of threat, or the member seeking a sense of community or “belonging” 
(e.g., McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Gang affiliation is usually produced by 
economics, poor education, dysfunctional family, and a longing for gang, or 
“brotherhood”, participation (e.g., Brotherton & Barrios, 2004; Jones, Roper, Stys, & 
Wilson, 2004). Religious, utopian, or psychotherapeutic cults (typified by the closed faith 
societies of my study), present a brotherhood, or affiliative, motivation, too, but members 
are also motivated by ideological factors, by a sense of eliteness, and by the cognitive 
dissonance engendered by the abandonment of such beliefs. The evaluative, or 
psychological, motivators are so intense that the member’s identity becomes absorbed 
into the powerful collective identity of the group (Huddy, 2001), members are unable to 
think independently of the group, and this identity becomes a core aspect of the 
indoctrination process (Ferguson et al., 2016). (It’s about the group, I once heard 
someone say, not about God). Years of this type of indoctrination cause psychiatrists like 
Winell to note that: 
The most difficult thing to overcome, by far, is overcoming the intense 
indoctrination of early years.  As an adult, for example, the fear of hell can pop up 
and cause panic attacks even if a person rationally rejects the doctrine. 
(“JourneyFree”; online) 
In contrast to the prejudice of terrorist or gang affiliation, when it comes to cult-induced 
prejudice, none of the standard prejudice-reducing interventions have the slightest 
impact. Cult members function, as it were, on the lowest levels of Abraham Maslow’s 
(1943) hierarchy of needs theory, where they know that were they to question their 
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indoctrination or associate with outsiders, they would suffer great loss, which includes 
their sense of purpose (Gallant, 2016) and group-sourced identities (Ellemers, Spears, & 
Doosje, 2002).  
Oskamp (1992) recommends exposure to atypical exemplars to inhibit prejudice. 
There is also the popular theory of combating prejudice by exposing the prejudiced 
individual to different cultures and other examples of thought, through channels like the 
internet, social media, courses on anthropology or comparative religions, travel, or films 
(e.g., Paluck & Green, 2009). The problem with suggestions such as these is that cult 
members, that include isolated faith groups, are sequestered from the outside world and 
indoctrinated to reject these influences. Leaving my-conformism aside (where people 
naturally tend to gravitate to views that confirm their own), encounter models are 
irrelevant to cult members, since members of radically insulated groups have little to no 
contact with the world and are bred to fear them. 
In short, it seemed to me that whichever way I turned, I came up against the 
logical fallacy of circulus in probando, or circular reasoning. I wanted to find a solution 
for extreme prejudice, but a significant population of those who manifest extreme 
prejudice grow up in environments that are closed to reforming impressions nor are they 
amenable to reflecting, nor can outsiders approach them. There are plenty of programs 
that exist for prejudice, but as Paluck and Green (2009) pointed out most of these 
programs are for weak to moderate prejudice, and the few programs that exist for extreme 
prejudice attract those who self-select or who are forced to attend.  
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My own research pointed me to the As-Is theme where individuals growing up in 
indoctrinated backgrounds seemed to reject their prejudices once they unexpectedly 
encountered a core left-cortical phenomena that collided with their emotional 
convictions. The As-Is came either from an encounter with a core text (a primary source 
as is in its incarnate form), or from seeing events or a situation in its lowest-level form. In 
all cases, the impetus came from the perceptor, rather than from someone trying to 
convince the prejudiced individual with a program or with reasoning. It was some 
cognitive fact from an experience, from something they read, from an act of kindness 
done to them that caused them to change their minds. For instance, Deen (2015) found 
that contrary to what he had been taught, Jews, outside his group, knew more about 
Judaism than he. When he communicated with outsiders, “I soon discovered a world of 
people entirely different from anyone I knew” (p. 128). Early experiences of this As-Is 
factor were “infuriating” to him. They “shattered the narrative he had been given” (p. 
128).  
An As-Is experience from critical reading was descried by one of Ibn Warraq’s 
(2003) subjects, when the person reads the Koran in English for the first time. The author 
described himself as “the typical religious fundamentalist, trapped in my own world of 
conspiracies; the Jews are behind everything” (p. 15). Reading the Koran in English (in 
order to correspond with an online group) was where things changed. 
“Prior to joining this organization, I hadn't read the Koran in English, instead 
reading it in Arabic (believing this would bring me Swaab - blessings). When I 
read it for the first time, I became very worried by the amount of violence in the 
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texts. Subsequent late night sessions with the Koran convinced me that I was 
reading a text to war.” (p. 127). 
The person saw the text in its essence, in contrast to the enculturated meaning 
imposed on it by his society. 
 Cross (2006) was affected by critical multidisciplinary reading where she 
concentrated on source texts. Intensive historical research showed her there were 
hundreds of books purporting to be the exclusive testimonies of Jesus and that it was only 
because of the subjective section of the Council of Nicaea that 66 books were called Holy 
Scripture. Cross (2006) writes: 
I closed my history book and stared out in the blank openness of the universe. If, 
instead of God’s direct revelation from heaven, the Bible was simply a 
compilation of religious writings that supported an emerging third-century 
religious sect, fundamentalist Christianity was a house of cards. Its cornerstone 
belief that the Bible was without error and thus could be used as a textbook for 
modern ethics was patently absurd. (p. 133). 
Finally, there is the As-Is altruism of the demonized other, described, for instance, 
by Harris (2011) with the impression of the minister who quietly fed homeless 
individuals from his own resources. The unexpected experience, or face-to-face 
encounter with pure goodness, shook his fidelity to his Church. Love doesn't happen, he 
wrote, by being isolated from the world, but by interacting with the world and engaging 
in practical, literal love. Almost all of the subjects described a long, drawn-out and 
tormented struggle, where it was only the desire to know the truth that pushed them on. 
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The experience of change must be felt by the subject. When Deen (2015), for instance, 
tried to share his experiences with his wife, he was unable to reach her. Similarly, 
Anonymous (2003) insisted it was futile to debate a terrorist’s beliefs. Not everyone is 
willing to change, nor can the impact of this change experience be transmitted to another. 
Recommendations 
Certain outsiders who penetrate the defenses of isolated close faith societies 
include doctors, social workers, certain specialized teachers, and other professionals. 
These practitioners may serve as channel to reduce harmful prejudices through their 
regular interactions with the group, by subtly exposing group members to ideas and 
influences that contradict negative perceptions of the other.  
As Anonymous (2003) insisted, we have to bombard strong believers with “facts” 
to overcome “the hurdle of tradition and false values imposed on us by thousands of 
years of religious upbringing… The word faith means belief without evidence” (p. 149). 
Strong believers need evidence. At these same time, because strong believers are in 
denial, this evidence needs to be subtle and “bombarded” - directed at them without it 
appearing manipulated by an agent: “The denial acts as a shield that covers them, that 
protects them, that saves them from facing the pain of shock and disillusionment. Once 
that shield is up nothing can bring it down (p. 148).” 
Messages also need to be customized: 
Because every person's sensitivity is different, what shocks one person may not 
shock another? Even as a man, I was shocked when I read that Muhammad 
instructed his followers to beat their wives. Yet I have come to know many 
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Muslim women who have no difficulty accepting these derogatory statements 
uttered by their prophet [because] they are in denial. (p. 148) 
Bertram (2016) noted that “factors that contribute to the radicalization of a 
terrorist may include religious discourse [and] deceptive teachings” (p. 124) and to 
counteract these deceptive teachings, workers should provide “counter-narrative[s] that 
identify the conflict between [the religion] and the distortion of [that religion] that was 
propagated by the terrorist organization” (p. 124). My study suggested these counter-
narratives should be fact-based and introduced as ingenuously as possible as though it 
were the believer randomly encountering them for himself, rather than an outsider 
pushing them on him. Invited outsiders should work from the strong believer’s 
perspective. Cult members exist in a paradigm outside of the secular world, therefore 
common motives like a good job, career, a college education, or money tend to not appeal 
to them. 
Change, too, starts with the influencer modeling qualities that contradicts the way 
they’ve been demonized. This means not only acting ethically and professionally, but 
also demonstrating deep, unconditional care to the other and appearing informed about 
the other’s culture while being broad-minded, well-read and knowledgeable on matters in 
general. Brown (2016), former KKK leader, was influenced by the Shabbat meal and 
background discussions of his Jewish college friends that were unexpectedly more logical 
and open-minded than anticipated.  
In short, outsiders who work in faith-based societies that practice extreme 
prejudice can contribute to preventative deradicalization through their communications 
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with members of these groups. Practitioners should challenge toxic views with a subtle, 
purely fact-based reasoning and approach the prejudice teachings from different angles, 
since people tend to respond differently to different aspects. These agents should be 
consistent, they should not attack the culture of the targeted member, and their 
mannerisms and involvement should indicate an outside world where people act and 
think contrary to stereotypes. Their attitudes, interactions, and conduct should be 
sympathetic, refined, and exemplary. Such invited outsiders include therapists 
(occupational, physical and psychological), certain teachers, school secretaries and the 
like.  
Although people are generally reluctant to interfere with another culture on the 
basis of cultural tolerance popular in the West, invited outsiders can be brought to 
recognize that their actions may not necessarily violate political correctness. Their 
motives are to target the harm-inducing prejudice opinions, nothing else, and they do so 
by appealing to recognizable facts. Unchallenged deceptive teachings could lead to 
disasters like suicide, homicide, conflict, violence, and terrorism. Invited outsiders could 
be told they are only professionals with access to such an unreachable group. 
Governments, or pace-organizations, can sponsor training programs for such 
invited outsiders as part of their professional training. So a law informant worker, social 
worker or therapist, for instance, could receive a course, as part of their training, on how 
to mitigate prejudice in a cult-like setting. Relevant programs could exist outside 
specialized training, too, and material (such as books, brochures, lectures) could be 
produced on the matter. 
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Limitations of the Study  
Yin (1994) points out that researchers who analyze documents or content tend to 
possess a “biased selectivity,” where the researcher may consciously or otherwise select 
documents that support his viewpoint and reflect her beliefs.  Furthermore, a 
documentary IPA has limitations which include the researcher’s bias, that their 
assumptions cannot be corroborated by subjects and that some of these autobiographical 
narratives may contradict other autobiographical narratives of the same genre. 
Additionally, a larger subject sample may have given me different, if not contradictory, 
results. Autobiography also lacks truth status (Trochim, 2006), which makes my study 
questionable from the start. Moreover, my study tested a prejudice typology produced by 
socialization, while extreme prejudice also comes from trauma (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001), 
which may render the implications of this study irrelevant to other populations. Finally, 
some studies (e.g., Farrell et al, 2013) suggest that cognitive-based attitudes are most 
effectively challenged with logic arguments, while affect-based attitudes need affect-
based reasoning. Since prejudice is affect-based, it may be that certain people can only be 
reached by an affect-based, rather than a fact-based response, and, contrary to my 
suggestions, would be resilient to fact-based reasoning. 
Implications of the Study 
If my recommendations succeed, they would likely do so only on a receptive 
personality. Deen (2015), for instance, was driven by his intellectual need for truth and 
disaffiliated himself from his group. His wife, Gitty, on the other hand was far more 
emotionally-driven. She persisted with her emotional retention to faith (“Our Rebbe,” she 
101 
 
insisted, “was not to be questioned. I was taught to have faith in the righteous.” (Deen, 
2015, p. 16). Hirsi (2007), too, noted she seemed to be the only one with doubts. Her 
friends accepted their social norms and culture. All they wanted to do was get married, 
settle down, retain their society’s approval, and remain part of their communities. In 
contrast, Hirsi needed her belief system to be logical and consistent. Some individuals are 
resilient to logic-based arguments and may only be susceptible, if at all, to affect-based 
experiences (Farrell et al, 2013). As Gielen (2017) argued: we need to move away from 
the “what works?” question towards the “what works, for whom, in what circumstances, 
and how?” 
Given these limitations, it seems to me that if my insights impacted even one 
percent of my targeted population, my study would be valuable in that it would 
exponentially affect that particular segment, with at least one individual desisting from 
tram sitting his, or her, legacy of extreme prejudice.  
Conclusion 
My study used an interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA) on 21 individuals 
to investigate how certain individuals who were brought up in closed faith societies 
voluntarily altered their extreme prejudice to outsiders. The research indicated that 
prejudice reversal manifested four themes: The overarching As-Is; analytical reading of 
group texts; critical broad/ multidisciplinary reading; and love or altruism, where an 
outsider’s goodness or kindness defied stereotype. The study suggested that governments 
could use this research to sponsor prejudice-reducing programs and material that draw on 
these themes for invited outsiders who work in a cult or in a closed faith group setting. 
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The invited outsider’s communication style should incorporate a subtle, purely fact-based 
reasoning and approach deceptive teachings from different angles. These professionals 
should be consistent, they should not attack the culture of the targeted member, and their 
conduct and involvement with the member should contradict how the group has 
stereotyped these outsiders. My study and recommendations have limitations, but it 
seems to me that if my insights impacted even one percent of my targeted population, the 
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